Nicaragua by NU. CEPAL. Subsede de México
ECONOMIC COMMISSION PCR IMIS AMERICA 
NICARAGUA: THE FLOODS OF MAY 1982 p ® THEIR TOCTS 
Cr-! THE SOCIAL A D ECONOMIC B E v H J T O T 
NICARAGUAS THE FLOODS OF MAY 1982 AND THEIR EFFECTS 





I. Characteristics of the Disaster and Action Implemented 
immediately thereafter 1 
1. Origin and Characteristics of the Disaster 1 
2. Actions Undertaken to Face the Emergency 4 
II. Assessment of Damages 7 
1. Effects on the Population and its Living Conditions 7 
2. Damages in the Social Sectors 8 
a) Health 8 
b) Education 9 
c) Housing 12 
3. Damages on Infrastructure 12 
a) Road Transport 12 
b) Railway Transport 16 
c) Ports and Airports 18 
d) Urban Infrastructure 18 
e) Electrical Services 19 
f) Water Supply and Waste Disposal 21 
g) Other Sectors and Services 24 
4. Agriculture and Livestock Sector 24 
a) Damage to Soils and Capital Goods 25 
b) Losses in Agricultural Production 26 
c) Losses of Inputs 29 
d) Losses of Products ready for Consumption 31 
e) Effects on Livestock 31 
f) Effects on Forestry 35 
g) Effects on Fishery 35 
h) Effects on the Medium Term 35 
5. Damages to Industry and Commerce 36 
a) Industrial and Mining Sector 36 
b) Commerce 37 




III. Effects on Economic Development 43 
1. Evolution of the Nicaraguan Economy as of 1979 43 
a) Main Features of the Economy and of the Problems 
Inherited 43 
b) Principal Aspects of the Economic Policy as of 
1979 and Main Achievements 44 
2. Possible Effects on the Economy in 1982 48 
a) General 48 
b) Prospects for the Economic Situation in 1982 
before the Disaster 50 
c) Prospects for the Economic Situation in 1982 
after the Disaster 54 
IV. New International Cooperation Requirements 62 
1. General 62 
2. Characteristics of the international assistance 
required 64 
3. Specific Fields Requiring Prioritary International 
Assistance 66 
a) Emergency Phase 66 
b) Rehabilitation Phase 71 
c) Reconstruction Phase 72 





Nicaragua has once again suffered from the aftermath of a natural disaster 
which imposed losses of life and material damages which will adversely 
affect the living conditions of the population. 
Within the past ten years, the country has been struck by three 
disasters which have attracted world-wide attention. The earthquake that 
destroyed Managua in 1972, which damages were never fully repaired, was 
followed by the internal armed conflict that ended in mid-1979 with the 
victory of the revolutionary movement. This civil war imposed a virtual 
standstill of economic activity, an unprecedented flight of capital, and 
heavy losses in human life and infrastructure. The new Government which 
came to power in mid-1979 formulated a development plan based on policies 
aimed at creating a more egalitarian society, and the adoption of a series 
of measures designed to improve the efficiency of production, within the 
context of a mixed economy to be consolidated in due time. 
The recovery after the 1978-1979 civil war has been extremely 
difficult. The high cost of repairing material damage has coincided with 
an increasingly unfavorable international situation for Nicaragua's export 
products. In addition, many tensions had been created by the re-orientation 
of the previous regime's economic policy in the present development 
programme of the National Reconstruction Government Junta. Such state of 
affairs is felt internally by the reluctance of important private groups 
to continue with their normal activities - let alone expanding them -
and, in the international arena, an increasing restriction of credit from 
Nicaragua's traditional sources, which could be noticed during the past 
twelve months. 
The previously described situation was further aggravated at the 
end of May 1982 by the occurrence of a meteorological phenomenon of 
special and abnormal characteristics. Intensive and persistent rainfall 
which lasted for a period of 10 days, killed approximately 80 people 
- the death toll could have been higher were it not for the timely and 
efficient action taken by the Government - and produced very high material 
damages, especially referred to agricultural resources and to social and 
/physical 
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physical infrastructure. Taking into account both the immediate damage 
and the indirect effects on economic activities in the near future, the 
losses Would amount to 357 million U.S. Dollars. This figure may be 
divided into three components: material damage (220 million), loss or 
damage of land resources (55 million) and indirect losses (82 million). 
In addition, it is expected that these losses will be largely responsible 
for the reduction of the 5 per cent economic groxjth which was anticipated 
for 1982 before the disaster. 
The magnitude of the damages imposed by the rains and the ensuing 
floods can be understood when considering the extensive total a.nd agricultural 
area which they covered, the type of losses suffered which have very slow 
recovery periods, the fact that they affected a key sector -the one which 
generates foreign exchange - of the economy and, above all, that they 
occurred when the country was striving to recover from the effects of the 
two previous disasters and to overcome the many problems which its 
development entails. 
This document - prepared at the request of the Nicaraguan Government -
describes the effects which this new disaster has had on the social and 
economic development of the country. CEPAL sent a special field mission 
which during a 10-day period collected and analyzed the necessary information. 
The CEPAL mission received full support from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and many governmental organizations, especially from the 
General Directorate of State Information (DIGE), the International 
Reconstruction Fund (FIR), the Ministry of Planning (MIPLAN), and the 
National Committee for Disasters. The mission received some basic data 
on direct material damage, collected by several ministries and organizations 
coordinated by the General Directorate of State Information of the 
Government Junta. 
The mission verified the expediency and efficiency of the Government 
and popular organizations to face the problems imposed by the disaster. 
Within a short period of time, part of the 70 000 people who had been 
moved to temporary shelters, was returning to normal life. Had not the 
popular organizations been available, there is no doubt that the human 
loss would have been much higher. 
/In spite of 
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In spite of its internal efforts, Nicaragua requires international 
assistance to efficiently attend the long-term effects of this disaster 
which - as stated before - are superimposed on the situation previously 
described. This document - in addition to describing the characteristics 
of the natural phenomenon, the direct damages it caused and estimations 
of the short and medium term effects on the economy - outlines the 
additional requirements of technical and financial international assistance. 
/I. CHARACTERISTICS 
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISASTER AND ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED 
IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER 
1. Origin and Characteristics of the Disaster 
The floods which ocurred in Nicaragua - and to a lesser degree in Honduras -
at the end of May 1982, were caused by intensive precipitation produced 
by the simultaneous presence of two meteorological phenomena. The first 
one is a low atmospheric pressure zone which was born near Punta CosigUina 
around May 20th; it nearly remained motionless until it slowly began to 
move North towards the Caribbean Sea. The second one is the presence of 
the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) - the equatorial band wherein 
the main windstreams of the Northern and Southern hemispheres converge, 
and which shifts along a North/South axis during the year - over the 
Central American mainland. The latter reinforced the tropical depression 
1/ft 
mentioned above.— 
The simultaneous presence and interaction of these two phenomena, 
each of which is capable of generating heavy precipitation, caused the 
intense and persistent rainfall which fell over a very extensive area of 
the Central American Pacific watershed - from the Nicoya Peninsula in 
Costa Rica to the Gulf of Fonseca in Honduras - and the great lakes basin 
in Nicaragua on the Caribbean Sea watershed. (See enclosed map.) 
The areas most affected by the tropical depression were the North-West 
of Nicaragua and the Southern coast of Honduras. Precipitation in these 
areas exceeded not only the long-term average and maximum rates, but 
-- in some cases like the City of Chinandega - produced more than 
500 milimeters in a single day, and - during the period 20 to 31 May -
about 70 per cent of the typical-year rainfall. 
Rainfall was truly extraordinary. After the first days of precipitation 
- during which the soils absorbed a sizable fraction of the rainfall -
practically all of it flowed toward the drainage system, carrying soil, 
rocks, trees and other materials. Runoff was so large that river discharge 
capacities were exceeded, especially at those points where the uplands 
join the coastal plains. The sudden decrease in slope and, in some cases, 




• - " t o c 
a «si c. va: 
S SZT.J3S 
c . . J . . ' 







<5. £4 U o 
fr*. M 
/ 
» o m 
<v o ~ • S? The "designations employed and the presentation of material in this • 
publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever 
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area 




the obstruction of bridges by trees and other materials carried by the 
water flow, originated river overflows which resulted in the flooding and 
erosion of adjacent lands and dwellings located in the upper areas of the 
plains, in the destruction of bridge structures and approaches, and in the 
deposition of the river solid load in lands located near the coastline, 
in estuaries and in open wells used by the peasants for drinking water 
purposes. 
The loss of vegetative cover and the soil erosion in the uplands 
were very significant. Equally important were the artificial widening of 
the upper river and stream reaches, and the deposition of sand and rocks 
in river beds and lands of the lower areas. Therefore, a sizable fraction 
of soil cover was lost in very large areas; large tracts of arable lands 
were also lost due both to river-bed widening and to sedimentation of 
low-lying areas near the coast. In addition, groundwater became polluted 
with sediments and pesticide and fertilizer residues which penetrated the 
water table through flooded wells, thus rendering it unusable for human 
and animal consumption. Also significative were the damages inflicted 
on Lake Managua; its level rose considerably due both to the direct rainfall 
and to the runoff received, which caused the flooding of dwellings located 
along its shoreline, the obstruction of sewerage and garbage discharge 
from the capital city, and additional silting of its already polluted 
water. In short, within a few days, the ecological equilibrium xras 
significantly modified. 
With the overflow of rivers, agricultural, physical and social 
infrastructure was damaged in varying degrees; the same happened to 
agricultural production and to cattle stock. Terraces and other soil 
conservation works in cotton-growing areas were destroyed or damaged as 
well. Road and railroad bridges and culverts were either carried away 
by the floods and/or damaged at their footings or approaches. Many 
dwellings located in adjacent low-lying areas were flooded and, in some 
areas, carried away. Finally, crops already planted and/or ready for 
harvest as well as lands prepared for sowing, were severely affected, and 
a large number of livestock drowned. 
/Natural 
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Natural and man-made drainage systems were insufficient to discharge 
the resulting runoff in the cities, especially in Managua and Chinandega. 
Maiiy dwellings, commercial and industrial facilities and public sector 
buildings located in low areas near rivers and canals and Lake Managua 
were completely or partially flooded. Heavy damages were also imposed on 
water-supply, sewerage, telephone and electricity networks. 
The road system was severely affected. The asphalt layer of long 
stretches of paved roads was washed away. Secondary and production roads 
were flooded and heavily silted. Electricity and telephone services were 
disrupted due to the falling of poles and the breaking of physical lines. 
The danger, however,- has not completely disappeared. In fact, there 
exists the distinct possibility that new intensive rains may occur which, 
coupled with the significant soil erosion in the uplands, may generate new 
floods and mud flows. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that 
the rainy season has only just started and that soils are at their field 
capacity. According to available statistical data, similar flooding may 
occur in the future, particularly when the highest tides coincide with 
the usually persistent rains which take place during September and October. 
It is therefore of utmost importance to immediately rebuild the 
terracing in agricultural areas and to desilt river beds. The 
strengthening of meteorological forecasting facilities to timely detect 
these pehnomena, thus diminishing possible damages, is also considered of 
high priority. 
2. Actions Undertaken to Face the Emergency 
At the end of May 1982 - and in contrast with what usually occurs in 
other places and circumstances - Nicaragua had available an extensive 
and efficient system for mass mobilization. Such civil organization, in 
close cooperation with the Army, enabled the expedient evacuation of 
people from the areas affected by the floods, and the provision of shelter 
and assistance to refugees in special facilities improvised for the 
occasion. This fact explains the relatively low number of deaths caused 
by the extensive flooding. 
/After determining 
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After determining the extent of the damages brought about by the 
floods, the National Reconstruction Government Junta declared the affected 
area a disaster zone, and created a National Committee for Disasters. This 
organization is entrusted with the tasks of assisting the refugees, 
determining their most pressing needs are, and receiving and distributing 
outside assistance. These tasks have been undertaken with efficiency and 
fairness. 
The Government Junta made a very preliminary assessment of the flood 
damages and on May 27 made an urgent appeal for assistance to the 
2/ 
international community.— Due to the urgency in preparing such assessment 
and to the fact that many towns and villages were still isolated, the 
Junta's report only provided an order-of--magnitude estimation of the direct 
damages and outlined priorities for the required assistance. 
Such appeal - supported by a similar one made by the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) - was accepted by some countries and 
international organizations. Aid began to flox^  to Nicaragua, even though 
on an insufficient scale when compared to the magnitude of the disaster. 
The National Committee for Disasters distributed all the aid it was 
receiving, assisting up to 12 000 families. Other Government and civil 
and mass organizations directed their efforts to attend other urgent 
requirements. 
The relocation in safe places of the inhabitants of city slums 
- who had lost their dwellings and household effects - was initiated. 
The re-establishing of communications, electricity and water-supply basic 
services was also started efficiently. The temporary repairs of partially-
damaged bridges and the construction of river fords to enable traffic 
through rivers xfhere bridges had been washed away, was undertaken as well. 
School activities were suspended. Their buildings were used as 
temporary shelters for refugees; students x?ere incorporated in cleansing 
and rehabilitation squads. A food-for-work programme was established in 




While drinking water and sanitary disposal of excreta services were 
unavailable during a relatively long period of time - and this situation 
prevails in some still-isolated towns and villages - inmunity levels of 
the population were very satisfactory due to the recently-undertaken 
sanitation campaign, and no epidemics have been detected up to now. This 
does not mean, however, that there will be no epidemics in the future 
since refugee centres are very crowded. 
In spite of the above-described activities, and the arrival of food 
and medicines from abroad, as well as medical and reconstruction personnel, 
Nicaragua still requires considerable assistance in order to fulfill the 
basic needs of the refugees and to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction 
of the works and facilities destroyed or damaged. 
The additional assistance most urgently required strives in foodstuffs 
in order to alleviate its present scarcity due to the loss of crops which 
were ready for harvesting, as well as heavy equipment for re-opening 
access to production areas in time to initiate sowing activities. 
/II. ASSESSMENT 
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II. ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
A preliminary assessment of damages imposed by the floods is presented 
heretofore. It is based upon information provided by Nicaraguan authorities 
and estimates made by a CEPAL field mission which reconnoitred the 
affected area. 
The preliminary quality of this assessment is to be stressed 
since information was available on direct effects only. In many cases, 
estimates were based upon the number of lost, or damaged units, to which 
unit prices were assigned. In other cases, improvised methodologies had 
to be devised to estimate the losses, particularly those referring to 
land erosion and sedimentation. 
An attempt has been made to quantify income which will not be 
earned due to the paralization or disruption of economic activities in 
some productive and service sectors. 
1. Effects on the Population and its Living Conditions 
Even though the meteorological phenomenon affected 35 to 45 per cent of 
the national territory, the number of casualties was indeed very limited. 
This is unusual for this type of disasters. An updated calculation indicates 
that a total of about 80 lives were lost and that nearly 70 000 refugees 
have been temporarily located in improvised shelter facilities. 
The very limited number of casualties - as explained elsewhere in 
this report - can be described by the existence of an effective and 
extensive mass organization in Nicaragua, as well as by the expedient 
action of the Sandinista Army. They played a key role in the evacuation 
and temporary sheltering of the affected population, thus preventing a 
larger death toll and easening the situation of the affected population. 
Due to the cleansing and rehabilitation work undertaken by the mass 
organizations, many refugees will be able to return promptly to their place 
of origin or be relocated in other, specially-constructed dwellings. 
/2. Damages 
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2. Damages in the Social Sectors 
The actions undertaken during the past three years by the Government to 
improve living conditions of the population were adversely affected. It 
must be recognized, howevers that damages to social infrastructure were 
of a lessor extent when compared to those suffered by physical 
infrastructure and the productive sectors. 
a) Health 
Before the floods, the National Reconstruction Government had 
initiated a special program aimed at the improvement of health conditions 
of the population. Hospital and other health centers damaged during 
the 1978-1979 war, had been restored and re-equipped. Preventive-
medicine campaigns had been implemented and their results were already 
in evidence. 
Three different types of effects were produced by the rains; 
damages or destruction of public health infrastructure; destruction or 
loss of medicines and equipment; and the need to initiate or reinforce 
some preventive campaigns. 
The damages to the hospital at Chinandega - its footings were 
undermined, which will make it absolutely necessary to evacuate a large 
part of its facilities - and the flooding and partial destruction of 
other, smaller health centers can be included among the first type of 
effects. Damage to X-ray and laboratory equipment, the loss in 
medicine stocks and the additional requirements of medicines resulting 
from the disaster, belong to the second type. Finally, the pooling of 
water in low-relief areas - which stillexists- may induce the appearance 
and dissemination of malaria, yellow fever, dengue and other epidemics; 
preventive campaigns are to be initiated shortly in order to avert them. 
It should be pointed out, however, that due to the relatively-high 
inmunization levels reached with the health campaigns undertaken before 
the disaster, no outbreaks of these epidemics have been detected. 
The crowding of refugees in provisional shelters and the damages to the 
water-supply and sewerage systems, however, do require the immediate 
implementation of said preventive campaigns. 
/In view 
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In view of the above, and of the need to provide health care in 
the new human settlements centers which will be mentioned elsewhere 
in this reports it will become imperative to create new modular»-type 
health centers and to build new water supply, sewerage and/or latrine 
systems for these centers. 
It is estimated that total damages in the health sector could 
be repaired with a 15-million U.S. Dollar investment. Of this, 6.5 million 
dollars would be required for the reconstruction and repairs of the 
Chinandega Hospital; 3 million for the repair anc! reposition of equipment 
and medicines and, finally, 3.5 million more for the preventive 
campaigns against malaria, dengue and yellow fever. (See Table 1.) 
b), Education * t 
Before the disaster, the expansion of enrollment in pre-school 
and primary levels, the improvement of the educators' capacity and the 
massive education of adults - as a follow-up to the National 
Alphabetization Campaign - had first priority in this sector's agenda. 
Important investments had been made to expand physical infrastructure, 
to acquire educational materials and didactic equipment, and to the 
establishment of a national network of Mass Education Centers. 
Although material damages in this sector are relatively minor 
when compared to losses in other sectors, the education program has 
received a severe blow, especially as refers to adults' education. 
Rural Mass Education Centers - which account for about 80 per cent of 
the total - were housed in temporary facilities which were washed away 
by the floods. Several teachers' schools were gravely damaged, and 
the first and only national center for production of didactic material 
was destroyed. 
On the basis of information supplied by the Ministry of Education 
(MED), it is estimated that - besides the Mass Education Centers -
about 60 school buildings x^ ere damaged or destroyed, including their 
material and equipment. A first estimate indicates that in order to 
replace and/or repair these facilities, equipment and material, a total 
of 3 million dollars would have to be invested. Of said amount, about 
1 million refers to material and equipment to be imported from 
abroad. (See Table 2.) /Table 1 
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Table 1 
NICARAGUA: DAMAGES TO THE HEALTH SECTOR 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 
Item Replacement Imported Component Cost Cost 
Total 15 000 9 850 
Infrastructure 6 500 1 950 
120-bed hospital 2 500 750 
Repairs to other hospitals 
and health centers 4 000 1 200 
Damaged equipment and medicines 3 000 3 000 
Preventive campaigns 5 500 4 900 
Malaria 4 000 3 600 
Dengue and yellow fever 1 500 1 300 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information furnished 
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National Total 58 3 055.6 916.7 
Managua 14 50.4 
Estell 1 139.2 
Jinotega 1 37.2 
Carazo 5 315.3 
Masaya 3 10.6 
Chinandega 23 1 716.1 
Leon 1 270.0 
Boaco 2 11.0 
Chontales 1 320.0 
Granada 7 40.3 
Others (Mass Educational 
Centers) • • « 145.5 
Source ; Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided by 




The Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements (MINVAH) had 
recently initiated a Programme of Progressive Urbanization which 
involved assigning land lots with minimum infrastructure - including 
water supplys drainage and sanitary latrine facilities - to families 
located in slum areas« 
The floods affected mast precisely the inhabitants of slum areas, 
which are located in low-lying areas adjacent to city drainage canals 
and in the shores of Lake Managua. Many other urban and rural houses 
located in other areas of the country were also subjected to flooding. 
Due to the high tides near the Port of Corinto, many houses located in 
the seashore were washed away as well. 
It is estimated that 6 400 houses were completely destroyed by the 
floods, and that 4 700 more x*ere partially damaged. Their replacement 
cost, in adequate conditions and location, is estimated at 20 million 
U.S. Dollars. Unrecoverable household goods can be replaced with a 
6 million Dollar additional investment. In other words, the total damage 
in this sector would require 27 million Dollars to be repaired; of said 
amount, 3.5 million refer to goods which must be acquired abroad. 
(See Table 3.) 
MIHVAH's envisaged plans to provide minimum housing facilities 
to the population of the lower strata will have to be notably strenghtened 
and accelerated, in order to furnish such facilities - as soon as possible -
to the 12 000 families affected by the disaster. 
3. Damages on Infrastructure 
As will be described, the floods of May 1982 affected infrastructure 
inflicting heavy damages and causing high income losses. 
a) Road Transport 
Flood flottfs damaged or destroyed the asphalt layer of 732 kilometers 
of paved roads; 1 000 kilometers of secondary roads and 2 500 kilometers 
of production roads were also notably damaged. This represents about 
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(Thousands of US Dollars) 






Total 26 660 3 500 
a / Units destroyed— 6 400 18 560 3 136 
Units damaged 4 700 2 100 364 
Household goods - 6 000 -
Source : Estimated made by CEPAL on the basis of information 
provided by the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements (MINVAH). 




secondary and production roads network. Seven main bridges - including 
the Guasaule bridge which connects Honduras and Nicaragua - and 18 
secondary bridges were affected; their approaches were trashed away 
and/or their structures were damaged. 
Bridges were destroyed by abnormal floods which washed away their 
superstructure and/or undermined their footings. Other bridges were 
virtually "plugged" by the materials - trees, trunkss rocks, etc. -
carried by the floods, thus becoming temporary dams, which fact explains 
the breaking of the weaker approaches. Culverts were insufficient to 
discharge flood waters, and were broken or totally submerged when 
river beds became enlarged. 
Due to the above-described facts, and that some feeder and production 
roads acted as discharge canals for flood waters, the runoff reached 
paved and secondary roads washing away the asphalt surface of the first 
and earthfills of the latter. 
The main damages to road transport occurred along the Managua-Leon-
Chinandega-Guasaule route and some of its branches, through which most 
of the inter-Central American Trade and the Nicaraguan foreign trade 
circulated. In spite of the provisional repairs of some bridges and 
the construction of fords in some of the rivers where bridges had been 
destroyed entirely, most of the heavy traffic will have to be re-routed 
through the alternate Pan-American Highway. This will undoubtedly 
result in higher transport costs since this is a longer mountain road. 
Damages to the road network are estimated at 111 million U.S. Dollars. 
To this figure, 6.6 million must be added for the replacement and/or 
repair of bridges, as well as a possible loss of 1.8 million in 1982-1983 
3/ 
due to the previously-mentioned increase in transport costs.— It is 
estimated that of said figure, about 48.5 million Dollars refer to 
imported construction materials - asphalt, structural steel, etc. -




NICARAGUA: DAMAGE TO ROAD TRANSPORT 










Total 117 475 48 465 
Highways and roads 110 900 44 000 
Paved 732 65 900 39 500 
All-Weather 1 000 25 000 2 500 
Production 2 500 20 000 2 000 
Bridges 6 575 4 465 
Guasaule^ 1 125 900 
Other bridges 
destroyed (6) 2 800 2 240 
Bridges damaged (18) 2 650 1 325 
Source : Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided 
by the Ministry of Construction and by MIDINRA. 
a/ Since Honduras is expected to share equally in its reconstruction, 
only 50 per cent of the total bridge replacement cost is included. 
/The reconstruction 
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The reconstruction and/or repair of bridges and culverts will require 
a thorough revision of the hydrologic criteria used for their original 
design. There are now available longer and more accurate hydrological 
and meteorological data series which can be used for that purpose. Higher 
reconstruction costs of said structures may then result. 
b) Railway Transport 
As in the case of road transport, the main railway line - which 
joined Managua and the Port of Corinto, and which provided an alternate 
route for incoming and outgoing Nicaraguan international trade - was 
affected. 
Eighteen kilometers of railroad and 9 bridges were con5>letely 
destroyed. The railway flow to the North-TJestern area of the country, 
which produced more than 90 per cent of the service's total income, was 
interrupted. Only the stretch between Managua and Granada is still operating; 
it is mainly used for passenger transport. 
The upgrading and modernisation of the railway was under consideration 
before the disaster. It was the intention of the authorities to widen 
the track and to renew the existing railroad units (cars and engines). 
After the disaster, a study must be undertaken to determine whether it 
would be more convenient to build a new route instead of improving the 
existing one. In addition, a financial analysis should be undertaken to 
determine whether existing tariffs should be modified or if Government 
subsidies are to be continued. 
If the existing system is only to be repaired, a 7.7 million U.S. 
Dollar investment would be required. Of said amount, 4 million would be 
assigned for reconstruction of the railway and 3.7 million for reconstruction 
and repair of bridges. If such repairs and reconstruction were to require 
a period of 15 months, the railway company stands to lose 1.7 million 




NICARAGUA: DAMAGE TO RAILROAD TRANSPORT 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 





of Income a/ 
Total 7 668 4 547 1 730 
Railway (18 km) 3 960 1 580 -
Bridges (span larger 
than 40 m) 2 712 2 170 — 
Bridges (short span) 996 797 -
Service - - 1 730 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided 
by the Ministry of Transport (MITRANS). 
a/ Loss of income during a 15-month period. 
/c) Ports 
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c) Ports and Airports 
The infrastructure of the main port terminal on the Pacific seaboard 
- the Port of Corinto - was severely damaged due to the simultaneous 
presence of heavy rainfall, strong winds and high tides. Wind and tides 
destroyed the lighthouse and damaged some pier piles; they also severely 
eroded the seashore and damaged the breakwater which provides protection 
to the port. As stated in the previous chapter, many houses were destroyed 
and there exists a definite threat for the road and railway - which run 
along the coast - to be cut off by the sea. Rivers discharged large 
amounts of sediments in a recently dredged section of the port. It will 
be therefore necessary to reinforce and extend the breakwater in order 
to prevent further inland movement of the sea waters and to ensure safe 
port operations - since Corinto is the main port of exit and entrance 
of Nicaragua's exports and imports - and to re-dredge the port to enable 
the berthing of large-draft vessels. 
In addition, about 25 airfields used for agricultural spraying 
purposes - especially of cotton - located inland throughout the affected 
area, were severely eroded by the floods. Their repair is also of prioritary 
importance in order to protect crops against desease. 
An investment of 13 million U.S. Dollars would be required for the 
reconstruction and replacement of port facilities as well as for the extension 
of the breakwater. The rehabilitation of airfields xrould cost about 
125 000 Dollars. Thus, the total cost of rehabilitation and replacement 
in this sector would amount to about 13 million Dollars, of which 
5.7 million refer to imported materials. On the other hand, the income 
of the port authority is not expected to decrease since the loading and 
unloading facilities in the port were only slightly affected. 
d) Urban Infrastructure 
Infrastructure in flooded cities was badly affected; 35 bridges 
and culverts were destroyed or damaged; water control structures and 
drainage canal lining were eroded or destroyed; and more than 30 kilometers 
of paved roads, 56 kilometers of cement-block streets and 90 kilometers 
of compacted earth roads were affected. 
/These damages 
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These damages will increase city - individual and massive - transport 
costs due both to the longer paths which will be necessary to travel in 
order to bypass destroyed and/or damaged bridges and the increased maintenance 
costs of transport units. 
An estimated 16 million U.S. Dollars will be required for the 
replacement and/or repair of urban infrastructure. Of this figure, 
8.7 million will be required for bridges, culverts and drainage channels, and 
7.3 million, for road repairs. Imported materials and thermal electricity 
generation for cement manufacturing will cost 10.4 million. (See table 6.) 
e) Electrical Services 
During 1981 electricity was generated equally by hydropower stations 
and thermoelectric plants; the latter requires imported fuel for its 
operation. Before the floods occurred, the Nicaraguan Energy Institute 
(INE) was rapidly working towards the completion of the Momotombo geothermal 
unit and of the electrical interconnection line with Costa Rica; these 
works will allow the savings of foreign exchange by reducing fuel imports 
and by the acquisition of less-expensive, Costa Rican hydropower. 
Except for the fall of an access bridge to a hydropower plant, the 
electricity generating capacity was not damaged by the floods. Damages 
to transmission lines, however, were considerable and affected long 
stretches of 69, 138 and 230 kilovolts lines between Leon-Chinandega, 
Leon-Pavana and Le6n-El Viejo. Nearly 100 kilometers of electricity 
distribution networks in the cities of Managua, Leon, Chinandega and 
others were badly damaged. 
Two projects under construction were damaged as well. Access roads 
and drainage protection canals for the production wells and the geothermal 
power plant at Momotombo were severely eroded, and an expensive drilling 
outfit was entirely flooded. Access roads and excavation works for the 
interconnection lines were similarly flooded. 
In the Western area of the country, electricity conduction lines 
were broken, and the zone became isolated from the rest of the national 




NICARAGUA: DAMAGE TO URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 
TiU Replacement Imported Item r C o g t Component 
° Cost 
Total 16 022 10 361 
Streets 7 281 4 917 
Paved (30 m) 5 272 4 745 
Cement-Block (56 km) 342 162 
Hardened Earth (90 km) 1 436 -
Sidewalks 32 10 
Bridges and drainage channels 8 741 5 444 
Footbridge (1) 492 246 
Streetbridges (22) 5 763 4 322 
Culverts (17) 205 102 
Accommodation Ramps 447 224 
Flood Channels 1 835 550 
Source : Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information 
supplied by the Municipal Secretariat (SAMU) and the Managua 
Reconstruction Junta (JRM). 
/order to 
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order to provide electricity in that area, which requires imported fuel 
for its operation. The delay in the completion of the Momotombo geothermal 
project and of the interconnection line to Costa Rica, will force Nicaragua 
to increase its oil imports in 1982 and part of 1983. 
Estimates made by INE indicate that repairs of infrastructure and 
the replacement of the drilling equipment will require a 2 million U.S. 
Dollar investment. Indirect damages due to diminished electricity sales 
and to increased oil imports for thermal power generation, will amount 
to nearly 13 million. That is to say, total losses in this sector would 
amount to 15 million U.S. Dollars, and foreign exchange expenditures to 
3.8 million. (See Table 7.) 
f) Water Supply and Waste Disposal 
Floods affected water-supply systems in approximately 40 cities; 
two waste-water disposal systems were damaged as well. Drinking water 
service was disrupted in nearly all of these communities, but provisional 
repairs were made at the earliest possible date; however, by mid-June, 
several towns were still without drinking water. Water catchment and 
diversion works, conduction lines, distribution networks, pumping equipment 
and their electrical facilities, and sanitary waste disposal works were 
affected. 
Reconstruction and replacement of the damaged or destroyed works 
would cost over half a million U.S. Dollars; one half of said amount would 
be used to import equipment and materials. In spite of the relatively 
low value of the damages, Nicaragua does not presently have the necessary 
equipment, materials and human resources; it is therefore expected that 
these services will be - totally or partially - interrupted for at least 
six months. The National Institute for Water Supply and Waste Disposal 
(INAA) will lose an estimated income of just over 4 million Dollars, which 
by far exceeds the direct damages. (See Table 8.) 
In order to avert the possible occurrence of epidemics due to the 
lack of drinking water and to the use of polluted water, it would be 
necessary to re-orientate at the earliest all existing foreign loans towards 




NICARAGUA: DAMAGES AND LOSSES IN THE ELECTRICAL SECTOR 
(Thousand of US Dollars) 






Total 2 113 12 850 3 785 
Power plants 190 2 550^ 2 686 
Transmission System 295 
10 300^ 
102 
Distribution Network 458 272 
c/ Other Items- 1 170 725 
Source: Nicaraguan Energy Institute (INE). 
a./ Thermo-electric power generation caused by the delay in the 
conclusion of Wbmotombo power plant and of interconnection 
line with Costa Rica, 
b/ Decrease in sales due to reduction of envisaged demand. 




NICARAGUA; DAIIAGE TO WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE SYSTEMS 
(Thousandso£ US Dollars) 




Total 629 315 
Water Intake Works 51 5 
Conduction and Distribution Networks 412 206 
Pumping and Electrical Equipment 47 47 
Sanitary Waste Disposal Systems 116 56 
Miscellaneous 3 1 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided by 
the National Institute for Water Supply and Waste Disposal, the 




g) Other Sectors and Services 
In addition to the above-described sectors, the following other 
activities were affected as well, although on a lesser magnitudes culture, 
cargo and passenger terminals, warehouses, telecommunications and tourist 
facilities. 
Damages in the cultural sector refer to undermining and sedimentation 
of several art schools and popular cultural centers as well as the cultural 
heritage. Their repair and rehabilitation costs amount to 1.3 million 
U.S. Dollars. 
Undermining, erosion and flooding damaged cargo and passenger terminals 
in Managua and other cities, as well as machinery and equipment for cargo 
handling. The amount of 475 000 Dollars is required to repair these damages. 
The telecommunications network suffered damages in physical lines, 
telephone exchanges and telex systems; some stored materials were lost 
due to flooding of warehouses. By utilizing materials initially earmarked 
for other projects, it was possible to very rapidly repair all damages. 
The cost of these repairs is estimated at 150 000 Dollars. In addition to 
this direct loss, the telecommunications utility incurred in a sales reduction 
of 85 000 U.S. Dollars. 
Flooding and erosion affected the infrastructure of some popular 
tourist resorts such as Xiloa. An estimated 150 000 U.S. Dollars are 
required for their rehabilitation. 
In summary, it is estimated that a total of 2 million U.S. Dollars 
is required to repair material damages, of which 150 000 Dollars are to 
be spent abroad to import equipment and materials not available locally. 
In addition, these activities will incur in a loss of 120 000 Dollars 
during 1982 in non-received income. (See Table 16.) 
4. Agriculture and Livestock Sector 
Nicaragua, since the end of the 1978-1979 civil war, had made special 
efforts to rebuild the productive stock of the agricultural and livestock 
sector; before 1979, machinery stock had been considerably depleted due 
/to its use 
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to its use for non-agricultural tasks. In addition, the breeding herd 
had been reduced by about 20 per cent due to excessive slaughtering and 
exports made by the previous regime. 
Since mid-1979 this sector was organized in a mixed-property system. 
Now, the People's Ownership Area produces about 14 per cent of the total 
value, while private enterprise accounts for the remaining 86 per cent. 
Since then, agricultural production has slowly but steadily increased and 
reached the output level of 1978. 
The agricultural plan for 1982 called for an increase in cotton 
- the main export crop - and corn production, one of the main staples in 
the Nicaraguan diet which, in previous years, had been complemented with 
exports. In broad terms, this plan called for output growths similar to 
the historical trends. All crops earmarked for internal consumption were 
required to grow in a similar fashion, except sorghum for which a surplus 
was produced in 1981. 
Rain and runoff adversely affected the agricultural and livestock sector 
in its capital stock, inventories and infrastructure. Damages were of such 
magnitude that they were only surpassed by losses in physical infrastructure. 
a) Damage to Soils and Capital Goods 
While the main damage under this heading refers to eroded or washed 
away soils and to livestock death, production infrastructure was also 
severely affected. 
Some 2 800 hectares of intensive-agriculture lands were practically 
destroyed by runoff when river courses were notably widened and/or when 
sediments, rocks and tree trunks were deposited on them; 5 600 hectares 
of additional arable lands were eroded, losing several centimeters of its 
uppermost layer, which will result in a reduction of productivity; 
77 000 hectares of land already prepared for sowing were affected as well; 
soil terraces in 24 500 hectares of lands devoted to cotton growing were 
partially or totally destroyed. 
/In addition, 
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.In addition, the floods caused the drowning of 11 600 heads of cattle 
- 3 500 breeding cows, 5 400 calves and 2 300 steers - which caused a 
further reduction of the stock which was just beginning to recover after 
the 1978-1979 war. 
Rains also damaged equipment, facilities and raw materials in a 
fertilizer mixing plant. Farm fences, nurseries and other forest facilities, 
irrigation and fishing equipment, and agricultural materials were destroyed 
as well. Finally, 1 200 hectares of banana and 1 500 hectares of coffee 
plantations were destroyed by the rain and floods; it will take this and 
the following year for their complete recovery. 
The total or partial destruction of access or production roads 
- as noted previously - used for transport of inputs and commodities 
required for crop sowing during the comming season - which begins by 
mid-July and must be concluded at the end of August - x/as also of great 
significance. 
Total losses in land and capital goods - excluding the damage to 
production roads - exceeded 68 million U.S. Dollars. The highest losses 
refer to eroded or sedimented land (55 million), since some of these soils 
cannot be sown for an estimated period of 10 years and/or will have much 
lower productivity. Damages to capital goods amounted to 13 million 
Dollars; about 4 million of which are required to import inputs and 
equipment. (See Table 9.) 
The fact that the above-described losses represent a severe blow 
to Nicaraguan agriculture must be stressed. Besides losing a considerable 
extent of its best soils, productivity will be reduced in another extensive 
area, soil terraces for the next harvest will have to be rebuilt or 
repaired, cattle stock was reduced and an input-processing plant was damaged. 
b) Losses in Agricultural Production 
Rains and floods affected both export and internal-consumption crops. 
The effects of the first will be felt more intensely in the 1983 calendar 




NICARAGUA: DAMAGE TO LAND AND CAPITAL GOODS 
IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 
Item Replacement Cost 





ca/ Lost due to runoff— (2 800 hectares) 
Eroded (5 600 hectares)-^ 
Destroyed Terraces (14 000 hectares) 
Damaged Terraces (10 500 hectares) 
Land prepared for sowing (77 000 hectares) 
Capital Goods 
11 600 heads killed-7' 
Damage to fertilizer-mixing plant 
Destroyed fences 
Damage to nurseries and other forestry projects 
Damage to fishing equipment 
Damage to machinery and equipment 
Banana plantation, destroyed (1 200 hectares) 
Coffee plantation, destroyed (1 500 hectares) 
68 177 4 185 





3 300 660 
13 295 3 100 
3 500 1 600 






6 000 — 
Source Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided by MIDINRA, 
the Ministry of Planning (MIPLAN), the International Reconstruction Fund (FIR) 
and the Department of Information and State Operations (DIGE). 
a/ Estimate based on value of production during a ten-year period, 
b/ Estimate based on the reduction in productivity over a five-year period 
(35 quintals of cotton at 1981 prices), 
c/ Of these 3 850 are breeding cows, 5 400 calves and 2 300 steers. 
/i) Export 
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i) Export crops» Losses in export commodities production were 
the largest since the disaster affected more intensely the heart of the 
main cotton and banana production areas, which products generate most of 
Nicaragua's foreign exchange. 
Even though cotton had not been sown at the time the disaster struck, 
the land had already been prepared. To be sure, terraces are built and 
soils are broken and plowed just before the start of the rainy season; 
these tasks had already been completed and were partially or totally lost. 
In view of the large number of terraces destroyed, it seems very 
difficult - if not outright impossible - to make all land preparations 
again before the end of the sowing period in late August. In addition 
to lands which were completely washed away or covered with sediment, 
extensive areas of Nicaragua's best soils devoted to cotton growing, were • 
eroded by runoff and leaching, which fact will reduce their productivity. 
Banana plantations are also located in the area where rainfall was 
heaviest. Bananas are highly sensitive to water excess, and they were 
severely damaged. The total land area of banana plantation, with an 
extension of about 3 000 hectares, remains vulnerable to fungus disease 
- mainly Sigatoka - as well. It is estimated that a total of 1 200 hectares 
of banana sowings were completely destroyed, and one million boxes of the 
product, which were ready for export and stored in warehouses, could not 
be shipped in time. Physical infrastructure - including access roads, 
fruit transport cables, packing facilities, etc. - was also affected, but 
its recovery is not as difficult as that of the plantation. It is estimated 
that total recovery will take approximately one year, so that exports in 
1982 and 1983 will be reduced. 
Damages to coffee plantations were less severe since they are more 
resistant to humidity and are located in the uplands where rainfall was 
less intense. Estimates indicate that only 1 500 hectares were affected 
- a small fraction of the total cultivated area - so that production will 
not decrease greatly. 
The harvest of sugar cane had almost been completed at the time of 
the rains, so that only 3 500 to 7 000 hectares were not harvested. This 
crop has a good recovery capacity; it is expected that cane-growing 
/activities 
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activities may be initiated as soon as soil humidity decreases. There 
were plans - before the disaster - to extend the area of sugar cane 
production in the present agricultural year. The main damage, therefore, 
refers only to the loss of about 80 000 quintals of refined sugar, which 
were stored at the Corinto warehouses ready for export. 
Minimal damage was inflicted on other crops such as sesame and tobacco, 
since they had not as yet been sown. The only loss refers to 25 tons of 
sesame seed which was to be used for the 1982 crop. 
ii) Losses in Domestic Consumption Crops. At the beginning of 
the year, the Government promoted the production of grains in irrigated 
areas, in order to alleviate a temporary shortage. Sufficient production 
was thus expected to meet the demand of corn and rice, until the summer 
harvest at the end of August. These crops were in their growing stage; 
some were flowering while others were in the process of ripening. Since 
rice is resistant to excess water, corn was the most affected of the two. 
Even though corn crops were not completely destroyed, it is estimated 
that 31 500 tons of this grain will have to be imported in order to meet 
the demand until the summer harvest is collected. 
All other domestic consumption crops were not affected since they 
had not been sown as yet. In the case of sorghum - which has temporarily 
substituted corn in the people's daily diet - there was a surplus in 
1981, which ought to suffice to meet the demand in the main affected 
areas. It is.not believed feasible now to reach the production goals 
initially set for 1982. 
It is estimated that, on the whole, agricultural production in 1982 
will decrease by 35 million U.S. Dollars. This would mean that the growth 
rate envisaged for 1982 xiill be cut from 16 to 9 per cent. 
(See Table 101) 
c) Losses of Inputs 
The necessary inputs for sowing the different crops were already 
available before the floods. As a result, a large amount of fertilizers, 




NICARAGUA: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION VALUE AND DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY THE FLOODS a / 
(Millions of US Dollars at 1982 prices) 
Crop 1981 As Planned After the Floods 
uiiieieiu;«: 
(Damage) 
Total 524.5 606.8 570.7 34.9 
Export Crops 352.8 396.4 361.7 34.7 
Ginned Cottoir^ . 106.8 126.4 96.4 30.0 
Sesame 6.5 10.6 10.5 0.1 
Bananas 9-7 10.0 6.9 3.1 
Coffee^ 180.7 189.5 188.8 0.7 
Sugar Cane 42.6 50.3 49.5 0.8 
Havana Tobacco 6.5 9.6 9.6 -
Domestic Consumption 
Crops 171.7 210.4 209.0 0.2 
Maize 55.8 72.8 72.8 -
Beans 41.1 45.2 45.1 0.1 
Rice 53.7 67.7 67.7 -
Sorghum 17.1 19.9 18.7 ç/ 
Virginia Tobacco 4.0 4.8 4.7 0.1 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of data supplied by the Planning 
Ministry. 
a/ The 1982 information refers to the calendar year, except in the case of 
cotton, sesame and bananas, where it refers to the agricultural year 
(season). 
b/ For 1982, calculated on the basis of international prices for mid-June 1982. 
c/ The decline in production is not due to flood damage but to the fact that 
there were surpluses in 1981. 
/lost. 
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lost. Their replacement cost is estimated at 1.7 million U.S. Dollars. 
(See Table 11.) Apparently only a small fraction of such inputs was 
ensured. 
d) Losses of Products ready for Consumption 
Due to the flooding of packing enterprises and port warehouses, 
there was a large loss of agricultural products, ready for consumption 
and export. The losses refer to the 1981/1982 crop and were mainly banana 
-1.2 million boxe? - and, to a lesser extent, plantains, sugar, cotton 
and coffee. The loss is estimated at 4.2 million U.S. Dollars, although 
most of these products were insured. (See Table 12.) 
e) Effects on Livestock 
The main damages in the livestock sector refer to the loss of about 
11 600 heads of cattle, as previously stated. This was due, on the one 
hand, to lack of food for several days since sediments were deposited on 
the grasslands of extensive areas; on the other, to the stress imposed on the 
animals by the floods, which prevents them from moving and eating properly, 
and which may last beyond the present rainy season. 
Even though only a small fraction of the total cattle stock in the 
country was lost, it must be noted that the loss occurred precisely when 
this activity was beginning to recover from the effects of the war. In 
this respect, it should be remembered that the war involved the slaughtering 
of nearly 20 per cent of the stock of cattle which in 1978 had reached a peak 
of 2.4 million heads. 
The effects of the rains can be noted through the main livestock 
indexes - a larger number of abortions, a decline in milk production, a 
further decrease in the calfing index, etc. - so that the losses will 
surely exceed those indicated in Table 13 since they will undoubtely affect 
productivity during the three following years. 
Poultry and pork production was also affected, and will decrease 
during the present year. These species, however, have a high reproduction 
rate so that these adverse effects can be easily overcome by means of a 




NICARAGUA: LOSSES OF INPUTS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Estimated Value 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 
Total 1 683 
Fertilizers 1 240 
Rice seed (9.5 tons) 10 
Corn seed (30 000 hectares sown) 300 
Cotton seed (9 tons) 9 
Miscellaneous inputs 124 
Sources Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information 
provided by the Agricultural Development Ministry (MIDINRA), 
the Planning Ministry (MIPLAN), the International 
Reconstruction Fund (FIR)„ and the General Directorate for 




NICARAGUAs LOSSES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS READY 
FOR CONSUMPTION 
Estimated Value 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 
Total 4 192 
Cotton (1 000 quintales), destroyed 64 
Cotton (4 000 quintales), damaged 128 
Sesame seeds 14 
Coffee (9 000 tons), damaged 180 
Sugar (9 450 tons), damaged 175 
Bananas (1.2 million bojees) 3 000 
Plantains (17.5 million units) 175 
Vegetables 10 
Fish 372 
Milk (46 000 gallons) 74 
Source ; Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information 
furnished by the Agricultural Development Ministry (MIDINRA)„ 
the Ministry of Planning (MIPLAN), the International Fund for 





NICARAGUA; LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION AND FORECASTS 
(Millions of US Dollars at 1982 prices) 
1982-
Produces 1980 1981 As Planned After the Floods 
Total Livestock 279.2 252.9 269.1 268.2 
Cattle 145.3 106.4 105.3 104.4 
Pigs 20.4 24.3 23.0 23.0 
Poultry 11.0 14.2 19.3 19.3 
Milk 78.0 81.0 85.0 85.0 
Eggs 24.5 27.0 36.5 36.5 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided by 
the Ministry of Planning, 
a/ Estimates only. 
/Estimated 
- 35 -
Estimated losses in livestock production for 1982, determined by 
comparison to the expected increase before the disaster, reach a figure 
of one million U.S. Dollars, which is equivalent to a decrease of from 
6.4 to 6.0 per cent in the production index. (See Table 13.) 
f) Effects on Forestry 
Damages to forestry occurred exclusively in several projects under 
implementation by the Natural Resources Institute (IRENA). They refer to 
losses of plants in nurseries - which were ready for permanent transplanting -
and of agricultural machinery and tools. In addition, expenses for repairs 
were incurred and there was unused labor during the time of the floods. 
In summary, these damages are estimated at 300 000 U.S. Dollars, amount 
already included in the losses of capital. (See Table 9.) 
g) Effects on Fishery 
Damage to fishery activities include losses in equipment and machinery, 
and a small reduction in the catch of shrimp and lobster since fishing 
boats could not operate under the storm. These damages were also included 
in the losses of capital. (See Table 9.) 
h) Effects on the Medium Term 
The direct and indirect losses of lands, capital goods and agricultural 
and livestock production, were estimated in previous sections. However, 
other damages are present x^ hose results will only be felt in the medium 
term. These refer mainly to productivity of lands devoted to cotton growing, 
since they were greatly affected. Part of them was washed away and deposited 
in the sea; another part received a great load of sediment, sand, rocks 
and trees; and one more was badly eroded by excess rain and runoff. The 
soils in this area are highly productive but - since they are very loose 
sands - are very erosion-prone to wind and rainfall action. Their 
productivity will therefore be reduced in the coming years. 
/Even though 
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Even though the worst effects of the rain and floods are already 
over, it is essential to undertake some programmes - such as the incorporation 
of humus - to restore the previously existing productivity, to prevent 
wind erosion of soils through windbreaking screens and to prevent soil 
erosion by runoff through the construction of conservation works in the 
uplands which are badly eroded and entirely unprotected. At the same 
time other protection works should be constructed in ravines which were 
subjected to erosion in their banks and which would otherwise continue 
to deteriorate during the normal rainy season. 
Those lands which were covered with sediments, sand, rocks and wood 
debris must be cleared in order to rehabilitate them for production, an 
activity which may take a relatively long time period. The river courses 
which became silted must also be rehabilitated in order to avoid new 
flooding in the near future. There is no doubt that it will be necessary 
to excavate and widen river courses and to protect their banks. 
The medium-term outlook for other crops seems less serious since 
- except in the case of banana which can only begin to produce again in 
1983 - recovery can be very fast depending on the country's ability to 
rehabilitate the lands in time for sowing at the end of August. 
5. Damages to Industry and Commerce 
a) Industrial and Mining Sectors 
Even before the disaster the industrial sector had been suffering 
from a progressive deterioration due to the scarcity of foreign exchange 
for the acquisition of imported inputs. The foreign exchange situation 
was so difficult that the Government had imposed a restrictive list of 
priority inputs which could be imported. The 1982 development plan which 
initially envisaged a 4.9 per cent animal growth for the sector, had already 
been adjusted before the floods in order to take into consideration the 
above-described situation; the growth of the industrial sector was then 
expected to be only 2.2 per cent. The negative effects of the May 1982 
floods must be superimposed on that already ailing situation for the sector. 
/After the 
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After the floods - and as will be seen later in this report - the growth 
rate for the industrial sector will now become negative (-0.4 per cent). 
Serious damages were imposed on the subsector of food, drinks and 
tobacco, as well as on the chemical industry. 
In accordance with the results of a special survey of affected 
industries (see Table 14) and with preliminary calculations, it is estimated 
that the industrial sector suffered damages of around 19 million U.S. 
Dollars; these refer especially to losses of raw material stocked in 
warehouses and customs, as well as to damage of industrial facilities. 
Only a small fraction of these items were insured. Most of the industrial 
plants located in the area affected by the floods stopped production during 
the emergency; production and sales decreased. The larger damage occurred 
in industries of the private sector, although some chemical and metal-
mechanical industries belonging to the People's Ownership Area were highly 
affected by the floods. 
Even though only preliminary information is available, the estimated 
losses are so great that, in spite of efforts undertaken, it will not be 
possible to achieve total recovery during this year; this is especially 
true due to the limitations in foreign exchange to acquire imported 
machinery and raw materials. Preliminary calculations indicate that the 
total loss of production about equals 2 per cent of gross industrial 
production in 1981 (estimated at 770 million U.S. Dollars). The effect 
of this loss, however, may prevent achieving the goals set by the Government. 
Total damage in the mining sector is estimated at 500 000 U.S. 
Dollars,and refers to the gold and non-metallic mineral subsectors. Three 
gold mines decreased their production and some access roads were affected. 
Production of lime, gypsum and other products was temporarily halted. 
b) Commerce 
According to very preliminary estimates, damage to local commercial 
establishment amounted to 3.5 million U.S. Dollars; they refer mainly to 
damage in stock, infrastructure - including markets and slaughterhouses -
and to ENABAS' warehouses and stock, which were only partially insured. 




. NICARAGUA: ESTIMATED DAMAGE TO INDUSTRIAL 
AND MINING SECTORS 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 
Item Cost 
Total 19 113 
Industrial Sector 18 613 
Fixed Assets 2 477 
Buildings 04 
Machinery and spare parts 216 
Transport equipment 260 
Other facilities 1 917 
Stock 2 299 
Raw materials 1 783 
Finished goods 511 
Decrease in production and sales 13 837 
a / 
Mining Sector- 500 
Gold 250 
Non-metallic minerals (lime, gypsum, etc.) 250 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information 
furnished by the General Directorate of State Information (DIGE). 





NICARAGUA: DAMAGE TO COMMERCE 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 
jtem Replacement 
Cost 
Total 3 482 
Damage to warehouses and stock (ENABAS) 1 180 
People's Commercial Enterprise 100 
Municipal markets and slaughterhouses 462 
a/ 
Estimated small-commerce losses— 500 
Estimated losses due to paralization of activities—^ 1 240 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided by 
the General Directorate of State Information (DIGE). 
a/ It was estimated that 1 000 commercial outlets - 10 per cent of the 
country total - suffered an average loss of 500 Dollars, 
b/ Assuming that 10 per cent of commercial establishments did not sell 
during two weeks, and utilizing the gross material product value of 
commerce during 1981 (approximately 300 million US Dollars), 
/were halted 
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were halted during the rains. Estimates made include loss of sales by 
commercial establishments for a period of two weeks. Nevertheless it is 
estimated that damages imposed by the inmobilization of assets can be easily 
overcome, and that their repairs can be completed by mid-1982. The 
interruption or obstruction of internal road transport and its corresponding 
cost increase - as well as that to and from other Central American 
countries - has reduced the inflow of supplies, which fact has correspondingly 
reduced sales even in undamaged commercial establishments. This situation 
is expected to continue until road transport can be fully restored. 
Finally, the 3 per cent growth foreseen by the Government for 
internal commerce and banking in 1982 will be impossible to achieve. It 
is estimated that growth for the year will be nil due to the above-described 
damages. 
6. Summary of the Damage 
The analysis of damages clearly shows that the most affected sectors are 
those of - road and railway - transport; agriculture, which lost both 
capital assets and production; and housing, especially for the lower income 
strata of the population. 
The industrial and mining, electrical energy and commerce sectors 
suffered damages which mainly refer to loss of stocks and future sales. 
Urban infrastructure was significantly and equally affected. Finally, the 
breakwater works at Port Corinto were damaged as well. 
Health and education facilities received relatively minor material 
damage. However, these losses were qualitatively very important because 
they severely affected the strong efforts to improve the living conditions 
of the population which the Government was undertaking. 
In summary, it can be said that the floods disrupted transport 
infrastructure, which is essential for internal and foreign trade as well 
as for access to production areas; jolted the strategic agricultural 
sector which generates foreign exchange and produces basic staples for 
domestic consumption; and affected the basic services for the population. 
/Due to the 
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Due to the type and magnitude of these damages, their recovery can only 
be completed in the medium term. The productive capacity of other sectors 
was virtually undamaged, although losses in stock and temporary sales 
reduction did affect them. These sectors, however, ought to have a speedy 
recovery. 
Table 16 presents a global perspective of the damages imposed by 
the floods. The total estimated losses amount to some 355 million U.S. 
4/ 
Dollars.— Of this amount, 55 million refer to temporary or permanent 
losses of land - one of the main resources of the country - estimated 
through the present value of the opportunity cost of the crops that would 
have been produced in such lands. An additional 82 million represent 
indirect losses, either as income losses due to reduced economic activity 
or additional operation costs imposed by the floods. Finally, nearly 
220 million Dollars worth of the country's capital stock will have to be 
replaced. About one half of said replacement will have to be imported 
(see Table 16). It is estimated that only about 10 million Dollars can 
be recovered through outside reinsurances. 
In order to better understand the magnitude of the - direct and 
indirect - damages inflicted by the floods, it can be stated that they 
represent about 20 per cent of the country's gross national product and 
about 40 per cent of exports made in 1981. There can be no doubt, therefore, 
of the significant magnitude of the damages. Their effects on national 
economic development are analyzed in the following pages. 
/Table 10 
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lable 16 
NICARAGUA: SUMMARY OF FLOOD DAMAGE ESTIMATES 
(Millions of US Dollars) 
Item Total Direct Indirect 
Import or 
Damages Damages Effects Export Component a/ 
Total 356.5 274.7 81.8 
Social Sectors 44.8 39.3 5.5 ; 
Health 15.0 9.5 5.5 9.9 
Education 3.1 3.1 - 0.9 
Housing 26.7 26.7 - 3.5 
Inf ras truc ture 179.5 150.8 28.7 
Road Transport 119.3 117.5 1.8 48.5 
Railway Transport 9.4 7.7 1.7 4.5 
Ports and Airports 12.9 4.9 8.0 5.7 
Urban Infrastructure 16.0 16.0 . - 10.4 
Electricity 15.0 2.1 12.9 3.8 
Water Supply and Waste Disposal 4.8 0.6 4.2 0.3 
Other Services and Sectors 2.1 2.0 0.1 0.2 
Agriculture and Livestock 109.7 78.1 31.6 
Land and Capital Goods Losses 60.2 68.2 - (4.2) 
Agricultural Production Losses 34.9 3.3 31.6 (33.0) 
Agricultural Input Losses 1.7 1.7 - 1.0 
Commodities Ready for Consumption 
Losses 3.6 3.6 - (3.0) 
Livestock Production Losses 0.9 0.9 - (0.3) 
Fishing Production Losses 0.4 0.4 - (0.4) 
Industrial and Mining Sectors 19.1 4.8 14.3 
Industrial Facility Losses 2.5 2.5 - 1.0 
Stock Losses 2.3 2.3 - (2.3) 
Industrial Production Losses 13.3 - 13.8 -
Mining Production Losses 0.5 - 0.5 0.5 
Commerce Sector 3.4 1.7 1.7 
Fixed Asset Losses 0.5 0.5 — 0.1 
Stock Losses 1.2 1.2 - 1.0 
Sales Losses 1.7 - 1.7 -
Sources Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of official information. 
a/ Figures in parenthesis indicate losses in exports. In summary, 91 million 
US Dollars refer to imported materials and 43 million to exports. 
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III. EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1. Evolution of the Nicaraguan Economy as of 1979 
a) Main Features of the Economy and of the Problems Inherited 
Nicaragua has the typical characteristics' of a small agri-exporting 
economy, based on a small number of commodities which make it highly 
vulnerable to the international economic situation. In the 1960s its 
traditional export platform was considerably expanded and diversified. 
In addition to coffee, cotton, sugar and meat were incorporated as : 
"motor" products, and at the same time some progress in industrialization 
was made within the context of the Central American Common Market 
integration scheme. The dynamic stimulus of the traditional export 
sector and of import substitution industrialization allowed for a rapid 
expansion of the economy as of 1960, but with a highly uneven distribu-
tion of its benefits among the different population strata. Thus, among 
the present main features of the Nicaraguan economy are its extreme 
dependence on phenomena associated with the international economy -and 
among these the shortage of foreign exchange which is the principal 
factor limiting development- and the many lacks and backwardness 
suffered by the bulk of the population. 
The devastating effects of the 1972 earthquake aggravated those 
inequalities, punishing to a great extent the low-income groups living 
in the ffiarginated areas of the city and adding thus to their afore-
mentioned backwardness.—^ The aftermath of the still unfinished 
reconstruction was superimposed on an increasingly intense civil upheaval 
which in tu£n led to a situación of progressive economic recession, 
characterized by a contraction of private investment, the flight of 
foreign exchange, growing external public indebtedness and, finally, 
considerable damage caused by the armed conflict which culminated in 
mid 1979 at a cost of not less than 50 000 human lives and material 
6 / damage amounting to some 500 million Dollars.— 
/When 
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When the new authorities assumed power9 a large extension of cotton 
and basic grains remained unsown; the country xjas immersed in an acute 
internal decapitalization process and an unprecedented external financial 
insolvency -the total external debt amounted to 1 500 million Dollars, 
with service payments that in 1979 would have absorbed 100% of the foreign 
exchange earned by exports of goods and services- open unemployment of 
more than 30% of the economically-active population and a fiscal deficit 
of over 1 200 million Cordobas,—^ equivalent to-70% of the Government 
current income. As a direct result of the war and because of the 
transfer òf capitals abroad, there was heavy decapitalization in both 
production and economic infrastructure. 
b) Principal Aspects of the Economic Policy as of 1979 and Main 
Achievements 
In the face of this profound economic depression and the 
paralyzation of most production activities, combined with the longstanding 
problems of Nicaragua's economy, the National Reconstruction Government 
Junta established a number of objectives which at the beginning of 1980 
8/ were incorporated into an annual plan,— and which were reinforced in a 
9/ 
second plan adopted early in 1981.— These measures were designed to 
reactivate production and were at the same time consistent with the 
objectives for social justice outlined in the Government's original 
programme. 
This reactivation was sought by imbuing the State's operational 
structure with dynamic force, in an endeavour to combine, in a system 
of mixed economy the interests of the workers, the Government and private 
enterprise. Incentives were offered to production and exports, both 
through credit and fiscal concessions and by fixing remunerative sales 
prices for the main export commodities. At the same time, an attempt 
was made to raise the level of well-being of the masses, not so much 
through a wage policy -although minimum wages were adjusted nominally 
during the period 1980-1981, real wages fell- but rather through the 
provision of services and other indirect benefits and the creation of 
/new 
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new employment opportunities. For example, ceiling prices were fixed for 
a basket of basic commodities and for rents; distribution channels were 
organized for essential articles on the basis of popular markets; and 
there was improvement in the provision of health and education services, 
most notably the literacy campaign launched in 1980. At the same time, 
the year-end rates of open unemployment dropped from 23% in 1979 to 17.8% 
in 1980 and to 13.4% in 1981. 
During this period an important change was also introduced in the 
structure of property, with the State confiscating all the assets of the 
overthrown political group.—^ In addition, an agrarian reform was 
initiated on the basis of expropiated land, and subsequently of the 
unused areas in properties larger than 350 hectares on tne Pacific coast 
and 700 hectares in the rest of the country. This land is administered 
as State enterprises or as co-operatives. 
In order to alleviate the external constrains, the new authorities 
initiated concerted actions with a view toward obtaining additional 
credit from abroad under favourable terms -the official loans contracted 
between July 1979 and December 1981 amounted to about 1 200 million 
Dollars-^-^ and renegotiations of the previously existing external 
public debt with private creditors were carried out successfully. 
Finally, important efforts were made to improve the efficiency of 
the enterprises which came under State control -the so-called Popular 
Ownership Area- and to improve the public sector's capacity to stimulate 
economic growth and promote the changes postulated in the Government 
programme and development plans previously referred to, although problems 
such as the organization and shortage of executive and intermediate 
staff hindered the attainment of these goals. 
Unfortunately, all these efforts were made within the context of a 
gradual decline in the world economy; this deterioration was particularly 
severe in 1981, and the main obstacle to economic recovery -the acute 
scarcity of foreign exchange- was seriously aggravated. Furthermore, 
the changes proposed by the National Reconstruction Government Junta 
were questioned both internally and externally and thus not free from 
/pressures: 
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pressures; private enterprise was reluctant to reactivate its investments 
in spite of the fiscal incentives offered, due to the uncertainty of a 
great many entrepreneurs concerning the medium-term future of the country. 
These pressures turned at timeé into acts of violence, which, among other 
effects, increased the concern of the authorities for national security 
and defence. Moreover, Nicaragua has -as the rest of the Central American 
countries- recently experienced difficulties in obtaining resources to 
finance its development, particularly when taking into account that, for 
different reasons, some important international agents have placed 
obstacles to the flow of new resources into the country. Nevertheless, 
since 1979 the Government Junta has accomplished important achievements. 
In 1981 the gross domestic product increased at a rate of approximately 
9% for its second consecutive year. Although real per capita income in 
the past year was 25% lower than that recorded five years before, its 
growth was considerable, if it is considered against a background of 
the adverse trends described above, and reflects reactivation from an 
extremely depressed internal situation. 
The production of goods recovered in 1981, basically stimulated by 
agriculture, with a 14% increase in that sector's added value, despite 
the fact that cattle production continued to fall during that same year. 
The rise in production was both in export and domestic consumption 
goods. The construction sector -the most severely affected by the 1979 
recession- had shown a distinct trend towards recovery during the 
1980-1981 two-year period -although it only reached 75% of the 1978 
level- basically influenced by public investment and the support and 
financing of low-cost housing. Notable developments in this sector are 
the virtual conclusion of the highway to thé Atlantic (Puerto Cabezas), 
the great stimulus given to the construction of rural roads, the works 
connected with the energy sector, and the building of hospitals, health 
centres and schools. In general, public expenditure -both capital and 
current- became one of the main dynamic factors of the economy. For 
example, the added value of the public administration represented 
one-quarter of economic growth in 1981. This, of course, also gave rise 
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to the financial disequilibrium which will be referred to later on. 
Finally, mining, electricity generation, transport and trade also showed 
a fairly vigorous growth in the recent two-year period. 
In contrast, the manufacturing sector has had to face the most 
serious problems in its reactivation, although it experienced a moderate 
growth during 1980 and 1981; some of the contributing factors were the 
destruction of its installations and equipment, the depletion of its 
inventories and the breaking down of the chain of financing-imports of 
inputs-productive process-distribution-exports. This sector continues 
to be affected by the lack of skilled personnel and by the private 
industrial sector's attitude, described above, which, in the face of 
the new economic policy guidelines, has discouraged investment and even 
led to decapitalization. 
As regards the external sector, exports growth has been severely 
limited by the instability and decrease in prices of the main commodities 
and in their purchasing power, and further limited by the rise in the 
average price of imports. The high interest payments for the external 
debt, despite its recent renegotiation, combined with the negative trade 
balance, raised the deficit on the current account to approximately 
490 million Dollars in 1981 -a figure which, for the first time, comes 
fairly close to the current value of exports- and the shortage of foreign 
exchange constituted a crucial limitation for the general operation of 
economic activities. This shortage contributed to the formation of a 
parallel market used mainly for non-essential imports and the movement of 
unrecorded capital, whereby the exchange rate almost tripled the official 
one, which introduced additional distortions in the financial area and in 
the general price system. 
On the domestic economy front, notwithstanding the efforts exhorted 
for austerity and rationality, the disequilibria and pressures of the . 
most important economic and financial variables still exist, although j \ 
inflationary pressures have diminished. In this respect, a source of . 
coilc6rn was the growing deficit of the central Government, which increased 
from 1 840 to over 2 900 million Cordobas between 1980 and 1981 
-8.5% and 11%, respectively, of the GDP- despite the increase in income 
/which 
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which almost tripled between 1979 and 1981. The rapid expansion of 
expenditure -in 1980 both, on investment and current; in 1981, only on 
current expenditure-, is consistent with the Government's effort to achieve 
its many and sometimes conflicting economic, social and security policy 
goals. 
To sum up, in the past two-year period Nicaragua faced two 
long-standing development obstacles -disequilibria in the balance of 
payments.current account and in public sector finances- added to new 
obstacles linked with the effort to introduce changes in conducting the 
12/ 
economic policy, within the context of increasing political polarization.— 
What is more, the country had not yet recovered from the damage caused by 
the 1972 earthquake, and still less from the considerable destruction and 
indirect consequences of the armed conflict in 1979. Now, in addition to 
this entire constellation of adverse phenomena, there are the effects of a 
new natural disaster. 
2. Possible Effects on the Economy in 1982 
a) General 
The natural disaster will have ¿lear effects on the evolution of the 
economy not only in what remains of 1982 but also and to some extent in 
1983. As regards the damage to certain natural resources linked to 
agriculture, its impact will be felt over a still longer period. 
In the first place, the growth rate of nearly all the production 
sectors will slow down, which, in turn, will affect the high unemployment 
levels recorded in the country, i.e., about 13% of the work force at the 
time of the disaster. Perhaps the only exception will be construction, 
where the urgent need for repairs to highways, bridges, buildings and 
housing will demand a high level of activity, which, in view of the high 
demand for manpower in this sector will probably offset, in part, the 
situation of increasing unemployment. 
In the second place, there will be an impact on the balance of payments 
due to the decrease in exports of agricultural commodities, either destroyed 
or damaged, and the increase in external purchases of consumer goods, 
/raw materials 
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raw materials for agriculture and industry designed to replace lost 
stocks and capital goods, particularly spare parts, and to put rapidly 
into operation machinery and equipment which came to a standstill in the 
productive sectors. In addition, despite the magnitude of the disaster, 
the flow of donations thus far received (mid-June 1982) continued to be 
insignificant in terms of the existing requirements. Hence an even 
greater current account deficit on the balance of payments is expected 
than the already high figure (520 million Dollars) estimated before the 
disaster. 
A third type of negative effects will be recorded in the public 
sector's operation. On the one hand, the reduction in the product's rate 
of growth will affect the collection of taxes, both direct and those 
deriving from consumption; as regards expenditure, there is no doubt 
that the austerity policy in current expenditure and investment envisaged 
before the disaster will have to be modified in the face of the urgent 
need to undertake activities such as the reconstruction of roads, the 
transport system, housing, hospitals, schools, etc. Possibly, there 
should also be increases in the subsidies to State agencies responsible 
for the distribution of food so as to allow them to revert to the 
operation levels required by the population. 
It is still too early to assess the full effects of the recent 
disaster on the general economy of Nicaragua. There is no doubt, for 
example, that the supply problems which it has brought about will affect 
the rate of inflation, as borne out by the efforts made by the authorities 
-with varying results- to exert a more strict control on basic 
commodities prices which shot up during the first few weeks after the 
disaster; also, connected to this is the great increase in the demand for 
certain materials that will arise as a result of the reconstruction process. 
In short, the disaster is having negative effects on three areas of 
key importance for the economic situation prevailing in the country: it 
is reducing the production of goods, with the corresponding impact on the 
rate of growth and, employment which are posed as crucial matters in order 
to face the unemployment problems and the existing plans to raise the 
populations's level of consumption in the short term; it is aggravating 
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the problem of the shortage of foreign exchange, which has already 
constituted a basic factor hindering the economic reactivation plans 
which have been put into effect since the new authorities assumed power 
in 1979, and at the same time it raises new requirements in terms of 
foreign capital, despite the high levels reached by debt service payments; 
and, finally, it is accentuating the disequilibrium in public finance 
with the reduction in public income and the rise in the expenditure 
required to repair the damages. It should be noted that the Goveriaaent 
has been making praiseworthy efforts in this connection which seemed 
to indicate that a considerable reduction in the absolute amount of the 
deficit might have been expected. 
Within the still preliminary nature of the figures, an attempt is 
made below to define somewhat more precisely the foreseeable effects in 
each of these fields. 
b) Prospects for the Economic Situation in 1982 before the Disaster 
The two main financial constrains which had characterized the 
13/ 
economic situation in 1981 with different intensity,— -extreme 
shortage of foreign exchange and serious fiscal imbalance- were 
accentuated after the first quarter of 1982, causing a drastic fall in 
economic activity -with negative effects on employment- and an increase 
in inflationary pressures. 
In the first place, the rigidities which were previously evident 
in economic relations with other countries, in general, became more 
acute. On the one hand, with a volume of exports which would apparently 
exceed the previous year's level, the further decline in world prices 
of the main commodities, would increase the loss in foreign trade, 
which the efforts to continue the reduction of imports would not 
compensate. Hence the current account balance would almost maintain, 
in general terms, the critical 1981 levels. On the other hand, the 
high level of cumulative indebtedness -which, in addition to the level 
of the inherited debt, is ¿xplàined by the éxecution of projects mainly 
benefiting the production sectors and economic and social infrastrueture-
/and 
- 51 -
and the difficulty to execute investment projects, determined that the 
utilization of foreign capital would not be high, so that an even sharper 
drop in international reserves was expected at the end of 1982. As 
already stated in the preceding pages, among the causes underlying these 
predictions, both the international situation and the short-term trends 
played an important part in Central America. 
Secondly, as regards public finance, the aforementioned difficulties 
which increasingly encouraged a less expansive expenditure policy, gave 
grounds for assuming that in 1982 the high fiscal deficit would be reduced 
basically due to a rise in tax revenues (improvements in the collection of 
taxes on personal income and property and new charges on beverages and 
tobacco). The fiscal situation, however, would in any case maintain its 
critical levels since, for example, the Government's coefficient fiscal 
deficit/total expenditure would only have fallen from 34% to 30%. It 
should also be noted that the above-mentioned efforts to moderate the 
vigorous growth of public expenditure with the aim of reducing the 
financial disequilibrium conflicted with various pressures deriving from 
the international situation which, for reasons unrelated to economics, 
required the orientation of more resources for defence in the present 
year than in the past. 
These diseauilibria -balance of payments and fiscal- owing both to 
internal and external factors had determined, as noted earlier, that at 
the beginning of the year the goals considered in the Government's economic 
plan had already contemplated a decrease of the growth rate from nearly 
9% in 1981 to less than 5% in 1982. Subsequently, the more serious 
situation with respect to the shortage of foreign exchange, over and 
above what was expected, had already determined an additional decrease in 
this rate as a result of more pessimistic prospects in the case of the 
manufacturing industry, one of the sectors which in Nicaragua is most 
14/ 
dependent on supplies of imported raw materials — (see Table 17). 
In order to understand the persistence of the low levels of real economic 
activity, it should be taken into account that the growth that had been 
predicted for 1982 meant that even the total added value at constant 
prices would be lower than that recorded in the mid 1970s, and would 
represent approximately 80% of the 1977 total. /Table 17 
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Table 17 
NICARAGUA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN 1981 
AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1982 a/ 
(Growth rates) 
1982 






Gross domestic product 10.0 8.9 4 ^ ' 0.7 
Goods 0.7 10.3 6.4 2.1 
Agriculture -10.0 14.3 7.4 3.1^ 
Mining 49.2 6.6 14.4 0.0 
Manufacturing 11.8 2.8 4.9*' -0.4 
Construction 117.3 34,8 7.0 10.0 
Services 115.8 9.2 •2,9 -0.8 
Electricity, gas and water 11.8 16.0 15.0 -2.5 
Transport, storage and 
communica t ions 18.5 6.1 • • * -5.0 
Trade and finance 16.3 6.9 3.0 0.0 
Ownership of dwellings - 4.9 • • • » « » 
Public administration and 
defence, and other services 26.2 11.8 0.0 0.0 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided by the 
Ministry of Planning. 
a/ Preliminary, subject to subsequent revision. 
b/ Already adjusted to take into account a decrease in the industrial growth rate, 
c/ On the basis of Table 10, an increase of 15.7% was expected in the agricultural 
quantum, which was reduced to 8.8% because of the disaster. This proportion 
was maintained in calculating the new growth rate of the agricultural product. 
The estimated losses in livestock production and in stocks of products ready 
for sale were deducted (see Table 13}. 
d/ Owing to foreign exchange problems, the reduction of this rate to 2.2% had 
been proposed even before the disaster. 
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At the sectoral level, with the exception of the large increase in 
mining -of relatively little significance in Nicaragua's production 
structure- and a levelling in Government services in real terms«- which 
was expected to be achieved without decreasing the volume of 
services rendered on the basis of greater efficiency and without filling 
any vacancies- it was expected that the rest of the activities would lose 
dynamism. In the case of agriculture, a slightly smaller increase than in 
the previous year was envisaged, on the basis of an extension of the area 
sown for production of domestic consumption goods (precisely by 
stimulating the production of basic grains, the consolidation of 
associative forms of production continues to be encouraged). As regards 
fishing, through the direct action of the State, the catch of fish and 
shrimp had increased significantly. At the same time, in the case of 
manufactures, action was being taken to promote the production of basic 
articles, of widespread use, such a foodstuffs, textiles and clothing, 
as also construction materials, especially wood. 
These results of economic activity, envisaged in general, since the 
beginning of 1982, were already occurring in the early months of the 
year simultaneously with the changes in some of the trends which it had 
been possible to achieve in 1981, particularly at two levels. On the 
one hand, in the preceding two-year period intensive efforts had been 
15/ 
made to partially overcome the serious problem of open unemployment,— 
which succeeded in consolidating a trend in this direction, which 
apparently in 1982 was losing some of its momentum despite the policy to 
stimulate the production of basic grains. On. the other hand, relatively 
satisfactory results had been obtained up to 1981 in substantially 16/ 
attenuating the inflationary process.— The continued scarcity of 
some staples, however, -although the possibilities for speculating on 
the market had been largely eliminated- in the early months of 1982 
lias determining a certain acceleration of the rate of increase in prices . 17/ 
This was even predicted in the goals of the Government's economic plan.-— 
Finally, economic trends in 1982 would have lead to a further 
deterioration in the real wages of the workers as the result of increased 
inflationary pressures vis-a-vis a somewhat austere wage policy, given /the 
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the generalized financial difficulties. It was also expected that, if 
new increases in employment levels were not achieved -taking into account 
that the total volume of wages would diminish in real terms- the levels 
of personal consumption would decrease. Of course, if these predictions 
are confirmed, they would interfere with one of the main objectives of 
economic policy which the administration has kept in force since it 
assumed power in 1979; the progressive redistribution of income. 
c) Prospects for the Economic Situation in 1982 after the Disaster 
As noted earlier, the natural phenomenon described throughout this 
study significantly alters the country's 1982 economic development 
prospects, thus adding to the list of obstacles described earlier. The 
following is a summarized review of the implications of this phenomenon 
for the main macro-economic variables. 
i) Rate of Global and Sectoral Growth. The external and 
internal difficulties which Nicaragua's economy had been confronting in 
order to maintain a growth rate in accordance with its rehabilitation 
needs -result of the civil war commented on above- which had led to a 
reduction in the growth rate predicted for 1982 to half that recorded 
in 1981, will undoubtedly be aggravated for the rest of the year (see 
Table 17). 
Taking into account the production losses observed in the various 
economic sectors, an attempt has been made to revise the projections 
prepared by the Government before the disaster. The estimated decrease 
in the growth rate, however, probably fails to reflect the full 
magnitude of the effect of the damage, because of the difficulties in 
assessing some indirect effects on levels of activity such as, for 
example, obstruction, slowness and higher cost of transport, or the 
greater relative shortage expected of certain inputs and other supplies 
whose use should be given priority in the more immediate rehabilitation 
work. Moreover, some of the effects of the floods -particularly on 
cotton, coffee and bananas- will be felt in the 1982/1983 agricultural 
year and, therefore, on the balance of payments for the next financial year. 
/The estimates 
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The estimates made for the 1982 calendar year indicate a substantial 
reduction in the growth rate of the gross domestic product» which 
altogether would decrease from 4.2% to less than 1%, which represent a 
setback of a least 1.5% in per capita income levels. The contraction 
which can be attributable to the disaster is fairly serious as far as the 
production of goods is concerned (the expected rate would fall from 6.4% 
to 2.1%), caused in its turn by drastic reductions in the dynamism 
originally predicted for agriculture -the growth rate of its gross 
domestic product would fall from 7.4% to 3.1%- and for manufacturing in 
which the rate would become negative. In the mining sector, the losses . 
-partly attributable to the reduction in gold production- would virtually 
nullify the expected growth although non-metallic mining would probably 
have a recovery in the rest of the year, in view of the additional demand 
for construction materials which is bound to be generated. In this 
respect, it is expected that the growth rate of the construction sector 
will necessarily be accelerated; the only case within the whole economy 
for the same reasons noted above. Naturally, the reactivation of this 
activity will not be sufficient to counteract the foreseeable negative 
evolution of the other productive sectors, so that the above-mentioned 
rate would fall. 
In the services sector, for which the Government had already 
predicted a very moderate growth of 2.9% -basically because of the 
austerity and rationalization programme undertaken by the public 
administration, including the State distribution apparatus- a contraction 
of about 1% is estimated as a result both of the effects on trade 
activities and transport, owing to interruptions in the road and railway 
systems and the loss of impetus of each, as a more direct aftermath to 
the disaster. 
ii) The Balance of Payments. The natural disaster will have an adverse 
effect on the various items which make up the 1982 balance of payments, 
although its adverse effects on exports of traditional commodities are 
estimated as being even greater in 1983. The estimates presented in this 




NICARAGUA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of Dollars) 
1982 Projections 
Item 1980 1981 Before the After the 
Disaster Disaster 
Exports,fob 451 501 549 521 
Cotton 30 122 122 96 
Coffee 166 136 179 189 
Sugar 20 49 49 49 
Bananas 8 6 7 7 
Others • • • 158 192 180 
Imports, fob 803 919 886 940 
Services Balance -135 -155 -200 -195 
Income 78 80 61 66 
Expenditure 214 235 261 261 
Donations 81 57 48 60 
Current Account Balance -407 -516 -489 -554 
Movements of Capital (net) 206 569 374 • • • 
Official Capital (net) 343 374 
Withdrawals 366 654 467 
Normal 280 411 467 
Renegotiated 85 243 -
Amortization Payments -22 -66 -93 
Undetermined Capital 137 -19 • t • 
Special Drawing Rights 5 5 • • • 
Change in Net Reserves 196 -58 115 
Balance of External Debt 
(due in more than one year's 
time) 1 571 2 141 • • • « a • 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided by the Central 
Bank of Nicaragua and other official sources, 
a/ Does not include 71 million due to the renegotiation of the external debt. 
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It shows, in the first place, an increase in the current account balance-
of-payments deficit of 65 million Dollars over that envisaged before the 
disaster, or around 40 million Dollars with respect to the 1981 figure, 
so that at year's end the deficit will exceed 550 million Dollars. 
The increase in the deficit is due both to the predicted decrease 
in foreign sales because of the effects of the floods and to the bigger 
imports required owing to the loss of stocks and additional requirements 
for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. 
The projections made prior to the natural disaster on the volume 
of exports were relatively encouraging and altogether amounted to 
550 million Dollars thanks to bigger sales of coffee, cotton and cane, 
and not withstanding a certain stagnation in the sale of non-traditional 
products, particularly those destined for the rest of Central America. 
As a result of the floods, external sales of ginned cotton 
-estimated at 122 million Dollars- will probably only reach 96 million, 
while those of bananas will practically remain at around 7 million ©ollars. 
Of lesser importance were estimated the decreases that will be experienced 
by the cane exports (see Table 18). External sales of meat, shellfish 
and, in general, the commodities purchased by Central America will 
probably also decrease, among other factors, because of the obstruction 
of the transport system. In short, total exports of goods would decrease 
from 550 to 520 million Dollars. The donations, which had normally 
entered the country and been assigned to the reconstruction process, 
suffered a drastic contraction in the early months of 1982, so that 
taking into account those which Nicaragua expects to receive in view of 
the new natural disaster, the figure for the entire year will probably 
amount to some 60 million Dollars, which -in the light of what has 
occurred after the floods- will be insufficient. 
In general, the losses of goods in customs warehouses, which were 
either for export or were entering the country for subsequent use, were 
largely protected by local insurance, which in turn was to a large 
extent reinsured abroad, so that the income envisaged under this 
heading in the services account can be expected to increase in the course 
of the year. 
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Importss estimated by the Central Bank for the whole year at 
886 million Dollars, will rise due on the one hand to donations in kind 
of 10 million Dollars which had not originally been considered -their 
counterpart being the income recorded in the capital account- plus 
45 million representing 50% of the total requirements of imported 
goods calculated in this report in terms of stock losses and/or urgent 
18/ 
needs arising in the various sectors.-— 
Logically enough, the capital account will also be affected, 
although the magnitude and characteristics of its evolution will depend 
on the volume of additional resources which may be mobilized, and on 
the country's capacity to implement new projects. In this respect, some 
sluggishness is noted in the utilization of earmarked foreign loans 
due to problems in executing different projects which have been started 
on the basis of this capital (utilization of net official capital which 
amounted to 654 million Dollars in 1981 should be reduced to some 
450 million according to estimates prior to the disaster). This 
situation entailed the need to utilize international reserves of over 
115 million Dollars. In the face of the deterioration in the balance-
of-payments current account which has resulted from the meteorological . 
phenomenon and the resulting needs in terms of imports and replacement 
of assets, in the next few months additional capital on very favourable 
maturity and interest terms will be required, particularly keeping in 
mind that the country's total external debt was already 2 150 million 
Dollars in 1981 during which year its servicing absorbed over 35% of 
total exports. 
iii) The Public Sector. Due to the important stimulating role 
played by the public sector and its efforts to overcome the considerable 
deficiencies in the provision of social services, since the present 
administration assumed power in the country, the. fiscal deficit is one 
of the greatest disequilibria facing the economy. 
In 1982 efforts were being made to alleviate this problem by means 
of a sustained increase in the collection of taxes -both direct and 
indirect- and by slowing down the expenditure expansion in relation to 
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previous years. Had it not been for the disaster, the fiscal deficit 
would have been reduced from nearly 3 000 million Cordobas (54% of current 
income and 11% of GDP) in 1981, to 2 600 million in 1982 (37% of projected 
income and 7.6% of GDP) (see Table 19). This would have been an important 
achievement, considering that it was to be attained without reducing the 
magnitude of the services for the population, and even though it meant 
a decrease in the real implementation of investment projects of 
aproximately 400 million Cordobas. 
The natural disaster modified the situation envisaged in several 
respects. The reduction in the levels of activity described above was 
bound to affect the levels of tax collection for the rest of 1982 by a 
sum roughly estimated at a little over 300 million Cordobas (a decrease of 
100 million in taxes on income and net worth, and a decrease of 200 million 
in consumer taxes). Despite this contraction, the income under this heading 
exceeded the one received in 1981 due to changes and improvements in the 
tax collection system (see Table 19). Taxes on foreign trade would not be 
substantially modified, since although there could be a reduction on 
export taxes, these are of little importance; in contrast, it is probable 
that import taxes will be maintained, notwithstanding their expected 
increase owing to the fact that most of the additional imports foreseen 
would be tax free. 
As regards the evolution of current expenditure, it was assumed that 
the principle of austerity in connection with wages and salaries will have 
to be maintained, in spite of the increase in working hours of many of 
the Government personnel connected with the emergency and rehabilitation 
activities, since to a great extent it will have to resort to voluntary 
work. On the other hand, there should be an increase in expenditure on 
the purchase of goods and services related to the above-mentioned process, 
and very probably, too, in transfers to some official institutions, 
particularly those responsible for the distribution of foodstuffs and 
other basic items. 
In accordance with the above observations, the negative current 
saving would increase by about 940 million Córdobas. Moreover, a 




NICARAGUA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Millions of Córdobas) 
Item 1980 1981- Before the After the 
Disaster c/ Disaster 
1. Current Income 4 526 5 523 6 923 6 570 
Tax Revenue 3 991 4 531 5 509 5 160 
Direct 934 966 1 161 1 060 
Indirect 1 840 2 684 3 113 2 900 
From Foreign Trade 1 217 831 1 236 1 200 
2. Current Expenditure 5 008 6 880 7 000 7 500 
Wages and Salaries 1 562 1 954 2 343 2 340 
J / 
Other current expenditure- 3 446 4 926 4 657 5 160 
3. Current Savings (1-2) -482 - 1 357 -77 -930 
4. Capital Expenditure 1 356 1 610 2 518 2 940 
Real Investment 972 992 « • • • • • 
Debt Amortization 170 381 • • • • • o 
Other Capital Expenditure 214 237 • ® • O 9 • 
5. Total Expenditure (2+4) 6 364 8 490 9 518 10 440 
6. Fiscal Deficit (1-5) 1 838 2 967 2 595 3 870 
7. Deficit Financing 
Internal Financing 450 2 018 745 1 020 
External Financing 1 388 949 1 850 2 850 
Source: Estimates made by CEPAL on the basis of information provided by the 
Ministry of Planning. 
a/ Preliminary figures. 
b/ On the basis of figures provided by the Fiscal Economic Studies Division of 
the Ministry of Finance, 
c/ Updated budget (on the basis of January-April collection; in the case of 
expenditure: January-May), the source being the Ministry of Finance, 




capital expenditure required for reconstruction in 1982, so that the 
fiscal deficit would increase considerably -from 2 600 to 3 870 million-
amounting to as much as 59% of current income and 11.3% of the estimated 
GDP. The increases in expenditure are fairly modest if account is taken 
of the substantial requirements for the reconstruction of the . 
infrastructure destroyed, and the fact that much of it will have to be 
redesigned so that it can withstand similar future phenomena. It has 
been assumed, however, that part of the new expenditure involved in the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction works will be based on the postponement 
or elimination of projects which were originally meant to be executed in 
1982 but which are less pressing. 
In any case, the expected notable increase in the deficit imposes 
additional external financing requirements on the Government, of 
approximately 100 million Dollars over and above the figure anticipated 
before the disaster, which means that the level of the 1981 disbursement 
will be tripled. 
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IV. NEW INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION REQUIREMENTS 
1. General 
As noted earlier, the floods inflicted severe material damage to physical 
and social infrastructure and considerably undermined Nicaragua's 
production capacity, affecting more intensively those areas in which 
the main country's economic activities are concentrated and, particularly, 
those which generate most of the foreign exchange and fiscal income. 
In addition to the prevailing situation which the Nicaraguan 
Government was facing -that is, the recovery from the 1972 earthquake 
damages which had not been completed by the previous regime, and from 
the 1978-1979 civil was- there is now the need for repairing damages 
brought about by this natural disaster. Furthermore, the Government 
had imposed itself the task of improving the standards of living of the 
population and bringing about a more equitable distribution of income, 
both of which required a very large scale economic effort and the 
mobilization of the people. The fact that the enormous debt inherited 
-in spite of having been recently renegotiated under more favourable 
terms- imposed high expenditure of the country's foreign exchange, must 
also be recognized. 
It is undeniable that the international financial community has 
made a substantial contribution towards the reconstruction efforts of 
the Nicaraguan Government by lending and donating a sum of about 
1 300 million Dollars as of July 1979. That contribution, however, is 
not sufficient for the country to recover from the damage caused by the 
two disasters that affected it in the 1970s, in addition to confronting 
the many obstacles to its development. 
The May 1982 disaster has aggravated the situation already 
prevailing before that date and will bring many and more serious adverse 
effects. On the one hand, it will be necessary to incur unforeseen 
expenditures for rehabilitation or repair instead of increasing the 
existing stock of capital, at much higher replacement costs than the 
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original value of the existing resources. On the other hand, the capacity 
of the national economy to finance that expenditure -in terms of both 
saving and the external sector- will undoubtedly be affected for a period 
of two or three years. 
Also there is a sense of urgency in undertaking some of the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction works, especially in connection with 
the reconstruction of access roads and the rehabilitation of agricultural 
infrastructure, since these tasks must be done in time to ensure the 
sowing of some crops such as cotton and basic grains, which cannot be 
prolonged beyond the middle of August. 
Notable in the first place, therefore, is the urgent need to 
provide Nicaragua, apart from emergency aid, with significant support for 
its balance of payments and public sector financing. This is the only way 
to avoid a considerable deterioration in the living conditions of the 
population and a shortage of liquidity which could prevent Nicaragua from 
meeting its international commitments. 
In the second place, it is considered necessary that, with the 
assistance of the international community, Nicaragua should face this new 
disaster in such a manner as to reduce or eliminate to its utmost any 
negative effect on the economic and social development efforts made so far. 
In other words, it is imperative to combine its rehabilitation and 
reconstruction efforts with the development plans being implemented before 
the disaster, endeavouring, in essence, not to alter the goals and 
objectives set by the National Reconstruction Government. In other words, 
international aid to cope with the damages caused by the disaster should 
be of an additional and not of a substitutive nature to that originally 
contemplated in support of its development plans. As a result of the 
disaster, the Government will not only have the difficult task of 
obtaining the external resources required in its financial programming 
due to the growing shortage of resources, but it will now require 
additional financing for unforeseen needs. 
In £h@ third piece, the assistance required for the three phases 
which follow a process of this nature -emergency, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction- should be determined. This does not mean that a strict 
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chronological order must be observed, since in some cases they could even 
be dealt with simultaneously or on a complementary basis. By way of 
example, it should be noted that the aid in terms of foodstuffs will be 
required until the new harvests are brought in, while rehabilitation and 
reconstruction works -already initiated- may well require a longer period, 
probably not less than 18 months. 
Finally, there is no doubt that the efficiency, speed and 
earnestness with which the Nicaraguan authorities and the popular 
organizations -at both national and provincial levels- have responded to 
the emergency imposed by the disaster, are a guarantee that the proper 
organizational capacity is available to mobilize and channel a 
/ 
considerable flow of international assistance aimed at undertaking the 
reconstruction and development projects. This capacity could be 
strengthened through external technical co-operation, for which a number 
of guideliness are suggested later in this study. 
2. Characteristics of the International Assistance Required 
Although it is still too early to estimate the full extent of the 
international assistance required to repair the damage caused by the 
floods, the estimates presented earlier in this study indicate a figure of 
approximately 220 million Dollars in direct losses of physical assets alone. 
On the other hand, it is feasible to indicate some of the characteristics 
of this assistance. 
Because of the type of damage caused, which largely affected the 
country's export capacity, and the balance-of-payments position, in the 
next 18 months Nicaragua x/ill obviously require additional international 
financing -both public and private- to prevent the complete breakdown of its 
external sector. In view of the considerable burden which the country must 
bear in covering the servicing of the already renegotiated external debt, 
that additional amount of net capital inflows would undoubtely raise very 
serious problems with respect to Nicaragua's indebtedness capacity, 
unless very favourable terms as regards maturity, grace period and 
interest, and donations could be granted. 
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It seems justifiable, moreover, that -taking into account the 
difficulties which the Government will have to face as a result of the 
disaster- a system of direct support, flexible as far as local counterpart 
contributions are concerned, should be designed and put into practice. 
In other words, it is essential that the new loans, in addition to being 
granted on highly favourable terms, cover almost the entire cost of the 
programmes and projects. 
In view of the extreme urgency with which Nicaragua needs increased 
foreign financial assistance to deal with the emergency, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction, in order to prevent the external sector from reaching 
a critical position in the immediate future, it seems in order to put 
forward some suggestions to the international financing agencies. 
In the first place unutilized resources of some of the loans already 
granted could be immediately reoriented and those which are "frozen" could 
be renewed. In the second, it would be desirable to grant preferential 
treatment consistent with the magnitude of the disaster and the conditions 
which prevailed before by making more flexible the procedures, mechanisms 
and conditions which are normally applicable in the evaluation and approval 
of loan requests, following the same procedure utilized for some projects 
initiated after the war. Finally, it would be highly desirable that 
financing should be provided for programmes -not for projects- in order to 
avoid the delays involved in the formulation and approval of specific 
projects. 
Fortunately, as a result of the reconstruction work initiated after 
the war, Nicaragua established an ad hoc agency responsible for analysing 
and directing the mobilization and absorption of its external resources; 
the International Reconstruction Fund (FIR). 
As regards balance of payments support, the country has already made 
full use of the procedures available in the Central American Integration 
process (especially the Central American Monetary Stabilization Fund) and 
it would not seem practical to reach agreements, within a short time period, 
with the International Monetary Fund. This support therefore should come 
from credit lines, inter-bank deposits from the central banks of friendly 
nations, and official loans from bilateral sources. 
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Finallys the United Hâtions Special Programme to provide emergency 
aid and development assistances, established by the General Assembly in 
resolution 3202 (S-VI) could be approached» since the disaster at the 
end of May 1982 clearly fulfils the requirements established for the 
purpose. 
3» .Spécifie ffields „asaqiging Priaritaty Sgrt.e.t-natâanai Assistance 
It does not seem necessary to await the completion of a detailed 
reconstruction plan in order to point out the projects, programmes, 
sectors or geographical areas requiring urgent attention from the 
Government and the international community. On the basis of the 
analysis of the damages presented in this document it is possible to 
identify the areas or sectors which should undoubtedly be given priority. 
These activities, which are summarized below and are presented in detail 
in Table 20, refer to the three aforementioned post-disaster phases; that 
is, emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction. It is once again 
stressed, however, that this classification or subdivision does not 
necessarily mean a chronological order of execution, or that they 
should be programmed in the future as part of the Government's economic 
and social development plans. 
Withouth underrating the damage in other sectors and activities, 
those which demand preferential attention are agricultural infrastructure 
and production, the road transport system, housing, food and health. 
a) Emergency Phase 
The floods affected the crops of basic grains ready for harvest 
and the soil ready for sowing, which brought about a shortage of the 
former and has imposed a considerable delay in the sowing and possible 
harvest of cereals, especially maize. As a result, food contributions 
will have to be extended to at least August or September, 
Furthermore, it is urgent that more permanent and safe housing be 
provided for about 12 000 families who lost their homes and household 
effects, by strengthening and supporting the programme which the 
Government has initiated in this respect. 
/Table 10 
Table 20 
POSSIBLE INTERNA! IONAL ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS AS A RESULT OF THE MAY 1982 FLOODS IN NICARAGUA 
Financ ia l Cooperation 
Stage and s e c t o r Programme or P r e l e c t P o s s i b l e Sources of 
Desc r ip t ion Cooperation 
31 550 tons of maize t o meet food Governments 
requirements through September PUA/FAO 
Ui'JICEF 
Cons t ruc t ion mater ia l and t o o l s f o r Goverments 
b u i l d i n g 12 000 dwellings IDB 
CABE! 
OAS 
P r i v a t e Organizat ions 
Emergency h e a l t h a s s i s t a n c e , i nc lud ing Governments 
p e r s o n n e l , medical supp l i e s and f i e l d Red Cross 
h o s p i t a l s PAHO/HHO 
Repair of d r ink ing water and waste Governments 
d isposa l systems IBRD 
400 t o n s of maize s e e d , 20 tons of Governments 
sesame seed and 20 tons of f e r t i l i z e r PflA/FAO 
Ref inancing of loans t o fa rmers ^htt CABE I 
l o s t crops or land prepared f o r IDB 
sowing IBRD 
Governments 
Programme or P r o j e c t 
Desc r ip t i on 
Technical Cooperation 
Poss lb l e Sources of 
Cooperation 
(a) Emergency Phase 
Social Sec tors 
Agr icu l tu ra l Sec tor 
Pubi ic Sector 
Ass i s tance In urban p lanning 




Assis tance f o r the r e o r i e n t a t i o n 
of e x i s t i n g loans 
PAHO/WHO 
IBRD 
/ ( C o n t i n u a t i o n ) 
Table 20 (Continued) 
Stage and s e c t o r Programme or P r o j e c t 
D e s c r i p t i o n 
F inanc ia l Cooperat ion 
P o s s i b l e Sources of 
Cooperation 
Technical Coopérâtion 
Programme or P r o j e c t P o s s i b l e Source^of 
D e s c r i p t i o n Cooperat ion 
(b) R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Phase 
I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
Agr icu l tu re 
Pubi ic Sector 
A c q u i s i t i o n of heavy equipment f o r Governments 
the removal of sediments and the CABEI 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of roads and drainage IDB 
canna ls IBRD 
Acqu i s i t i on of ' B a i l e y " - b r idges Governments 
f o r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the road CABEI 
sys tem- • " IDB 
IBRD 
Teiuporary r e p a i r of highways, Governments 
r o a d s , br idges and a i r s t r i p s , t o CABEI 
r e s t o r e access through the a f f e c t e d 
a rea 
E s t a b l i s h i n g of a f a c t o r y of Governments 
p r e - s t r e s s e d concre te coupfinente 
f o r the eons t rue t l oh of b r idges 
Acqu i s i t i on of a g r i c u l t u r a l Governments 
machinery and implements f o r the CABEI 
r e p a i r of t e r r a c e s and p r e p a r a t i o n 
of l and f o r sowing 
Loans t o Central Bank of Nicaragua Central Banks 
t o suppor t the balance of payments CAI1C 
Governments 
Channel l ing of spec i a l resources Governments 
t o the p u b l i c s e c t o r through l i n e s 
of c r e d i t and budgetary support 
Governments 
WHO 
Hydrological s t u d i e s t o determine 
design f l o o d s f o r b r idges and 
c u l v e r t s 
Techni-economical s tudy to determine CABEI 
the bes t way of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the Governments 
ra i lway system; a n a l y s i s of the 




Ass i s t ance In the fo rmu la t i on of 
development programmes and 
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Table 20 (Continued) 
Stage and s e c t o r 
F inancia l Cooperation Technical Cooperation 
Programme or P r o j e c t 
Desc r ip t i on 
Pos s ib l e Sources of 
Cooperation 
Programme or P r o j e c t 
Desc r ip t ion 
Pos s ib l e Source of 
Cooperation 
Pub l i c Sec tor (Concluded) 
Health Sector 
Housing Sec tor 
(c) Reconstruct ion Phase 
I n f r a s t r u c t u r e Sector 
Campaign f.ôf1 the p reven t ion of m a l a r i a . Governments 
dengue, yellow f e v e r , e t c . PAHO/WHO 




Permanent r e p a i r s t o t h e road and CABEI 
rai lway systems, inc luding b r i d g e s , IDB 
c u l v e r t s and storm drainage systems IBRD 
in urban a r ea s Governments 
Repair and p r o t e c t i o n of r i v e r banks CABEI 
whicfi were eroded or obs t ruc ted IDB 
IBRD 
IFAD 
Repair and ex tens ion of breakwaters CABEI 
in Cor ln to IDB 
IBRD 
Governments 
Establ ishment of meteorological and Governments 
hydro!oglcal system f o r f l ood and IfflO 
hur r icane f o r e c a s t i n g UNDP' 
Inclusion of programmes of damage CEPAL / ILPES 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n UNDP 
In the economic development p lans TCD 
Ass is tance In the fo rmula t ion of Governments 
prevent ion campaigns PAHO/WHO 
<T> vO 
/ ( C o n t i n u a t i o n ) 
Table 20 (Continued) 
Stage and s e c t o r 
Financia l Cooperation 
P r o g r a m e or P r o j e c t 
Desc r ip t i on 
Poss ib l e Sources of 
Cooperation 
Programe or P r o j e c t 
D e s c r i p t i o n 
Technical Coopérât 1 on 
P o s s i b l e Source of 
Cooperation 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Sec tor 
P u b l i c Sec tor 
M 
O fi O. (D ft 
Increase and improvement of t he na t iona l 
s tock of c a t t l e 
Erosion and r e f o r e s t a t i o n control 
programme in the uplands 
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n s of land covered by 





Crea t ion of a spec ia l fund t o a t t end 
immediate needs and a minimum stock 
of emergency m a t e r i a l s In case1 of 
f u t u r e d i s a s t e r s , p r e f e r a b l y at the 




Design of the programme 
Research of the e f f e c t s of 
sed imenta t ion in e s t u a r i e s and 
coas t a l l akes f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of 
marine f a u n a , and the eco log ica l 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s which ccurred in 
Lake Managua 
Study on changes in the general 
environment as a r e s u l t of t h e 
d e s a s t e r 
Inc lus ion of d i s a s t e r v u l n e r a b i l i t y 
a n a l y s i s in a l l 
p r o j e c t s 
deve! op ment 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a reas prone, t o 
d i f f i c u l t types of d i s a s t e r s , and 
es tab l i shment of d i s a s t e r - r e s i s t a n t 


















UNDP Inc lus ion of p r o j e c t s and programmes 
f o r na tu ra l d i s a s t e r p r even t ion and UNDRO 
f o r e c a s t i n g in the na t iona l CEPAL/ILPES 
development p lans 
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In order to prevent an outbreak of epidemics among the flood victims 
owing to the crowded conditions of the provisional shelters» it is urgent 
that these be provided with preventive and curative medical services and 
the necessary medical supplies, and to continue the use of campaign 
hospitals which recently arrived. Another urgent matter is to repair 
and re-establish the drinking water and sanitary disposal systems in some 
towns of the interior. 
In order to ensure that sowing is completed in time, it is of the 
utmost priority to have the necessary fertilizers, seeds and other inputs, 
and to be able to refinance the farmers who lost their crops and land 
ready for sowing. 
b) Rehabilitation Phase 
While recognizing the need for some overlap between the emergency 
and rehabilitation phases, and between these two and the reconstruction 
phases, it is important to point out the most urgently needed 
rehabilitation activities. 
In view of the urgency imposed by the climatic conditions, it is 
pressing to repair the production roads providing access for inputs and 
machinery in the agricultural areas? to rebuild thé terraces on the land 
used for cotton-growing; to sow all the basic grains and cotton, and to 
rehabilitate and repair the air fields required for agricultural pest 
control. These activities should be completed within a very short 
period in order to ensure a timely summer harvest. 
It is also necessary to continue the temporary repair of the 
damage to the road transport system, filling in the approaches to the 
bridges, repairing culverts and constructing fords with minimum safety 
conditions or using Bailey structures in the case of bridges which were 
completely destroyed or their structure seriously affected. This work 
has already been initiated by the Government with the cooperation of 
friendly countries. The same action must be taken in the case of the 
secondary roads network. For these activities it is necessary to 
acquire heavy earth-moving machinery to supplement the units available 
in the country. 
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Finally, another necessary step is to start the aforementioned 
campaigns for the prevention of malaria, dengue and yellow fever, before 
the effects of the propagating vectors start« 
c) Reconstruction Phase 
Taking into account the above-mentioned overlap with the 
rehabilitation activities, it would be necessary to undertake the final 
reconstruction of the road and agricultural infrastructure, the renewal 
of banana plantations, the final rehabilitation of land eroded and 
v 
silted, and of river channels which overflowed their banks, and the 
reconstruction of urban, port and airfield infrastructure. 
The reconstruction of bridges and culverts which were damaged or 
destroyed should only be undertaken after a review of the hydrometereo-
logical design criteria in the area has been completed. The same may be 
said of rain drainage canals and structures in the cities, and of the 
correction, removal of obstructions and definite protection of river 
courses in the coastal areas. 
The road transport system will also have to be definitely repaired, 
adequately replacing the surfaces? the railroad track will have to be 
reconstructed along the lines most compatible to the needs of the 
country. 
Work designed to protect uplands against progressive erosion should 
be started, by reforestation, constructing soil retention and conservation 
works and establishing tree or bush wind breakers. Permanent 
rehabilitation tasks would also be necessary on land upon which large 
volumes of sediment were deposited, by removing debris, stones and tree 
trunks. Fences and other minor agricultural and stock-breeding 
structures should also be rebuilt. 
Moreover, it will be essential to strengthen and extend the 
coastal protection works (breakwaters) in the port of Corinto, so as to 
prevent the sea from advancing further inland. 
The health and education infrastructure, together with educational 
materials and the stock of medical supplies should also be replaced on a 
permanent basis, taking into account the location of the new settlements. 
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Lastly» and equally important» would be the establishment of a 
system of surface and altitude meteorological stations -including radar 
and radiosonde-» the reconstruction of hydrometric stations carried away 
by the currents, and the undertaking of specialized training in 
forecasting for Nicaraguan personnel. This would enable the availability 
of an efficient forecasting system to lessen the damage of future 
disasters. 
4. International Technical Cooperation 
The financial cooperation projects and programmes which have just been 
outlined should be supplemented by technical assistance additional to 
that which international organizations and friendly Governments are 
currently providing. This assistance should be basically oriented 
towards supporting the Government for National Reconstruction in dealing 
with economic areas and sectors defined as of prioritary importance» 
and particularly in the formulation of specific rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and development programmes and projects in order to 
facilitate and accelerate the granting of external financing. This 
cooperation could also be oriented towards the inclusion of the 
disaster requirements in national development plans. 
Technical assistance could also be required in the formulation 
of plans for the reconstruction of road, railroad and drainage 
infrastructure and in a thorough study of the hydrological regime 
of rivers and in the establishment of an efficient flood forecasting 
system. 
There is also the need to provide assistance in formulating plans 
for the recovery of debris-strewn land, the protection of eroded land, 
erosion control on the highlands and reforestation; in short, for 
control of the soil and forests so seriously affected. Cooperation in 
analysis and counteraction of the effects on marine fauna caused by 
the sediment deposited in estuaries might also be required. 
Finally, there might be a need for advisory assistance in the 
planning of human settlements, with the aim of relocating the flood 
victims by applying the best criteria possible. 
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To sum up, after the emergency phase -in which the cooperation of 
Governments, UNDRO, WFP, the International Red Cross and PAHO is crucial 
for the subsequent stages of rehabilitation and reconstruction- the 
Government of Nicaragua should urgently devote itself to the task of 
defining, as precisely as possible, the priorities and periods to 
undertake and complete the various fields of activities envisaged. 
Obviously, the sounder the basis and rationality with which action 
priorities converted into projects and preliminary projects can be 
submitted, the greater will be the possibilities that international, 
regional and sub-regional financing institutions, as well as friendly 
Governments, will make available the resources in the amount and on 
the conditions required. Perhaps one of the immediate steps would be 
to create technical ad-hoc groups, with the collaboration of 
international assistance, in order to prepare the required draft 
projects for at least the following fields? road transport 
infrastructure, bridges, railways, land management and protection, 
housing and human settlements. Once the Government has stated its 
needs in terms o£ technical assistance for this phase, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) could be entrusted with the 
task of finding and mobilizing the required expertise. 
/NOTES 
KOTES 
1/ Some newspaper accounts initially attributed the occurrence of the 
persistent rains to tropical storm Aletta. However, reliable information 
obtained by means of meteorological satellite photographs and from radio-
sonde stations, indicate that Aletta was already far away from 
Central America at the time of the disaster. 
2/ See General Secretariat of the National Reconstruction Government 
Junta, Informe preliminar de la cuantificación de los daños ocasionados 
por el desastre, Managua, 27 May, 1982. 
3/ The increase in transport costs does not affect Nicaragua only. 
Preliminary estimates show that the other Central American countries will 
have to pay an additional 1.4 million Dollars in transport costs during 
the next 18 months, as a result of the damages on the Nicaraguan road 
network. 
4/ The same meteorological phenomenon! also imposed heavy damage in 
neighboring Costa Rica and Honduras. Even though the CEPAL mission did 
not visit these countries, because their respective governments did not 
request it, the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) has estimated 
that in Honduras alone 200 people died and material losses amounted to 
about 100 million Dollars, of which 60 million refer to the agricultural 
sector, 30 million to roads and bridges, and the rest to education, health 
and housing facilities. In addition, water-supply systems are reported 
to be severely affected, thereby imposing danger of epidemics. 
5/ See CEPAL, Informe sobre los daños y repercusiones del terremoto de 
la ciudad de Managua en la economía nicaragüense (E/CN.12/AC.64/2/Rev.1), 
January 1973. 
6/ See CEPAL, Nicaragua; Repercusiones económicas de los acontecimientos 
políticos recientes (E/CEPaL/G.1091/Rev. 1), December 1979. 
Tj The Córdoba is Nicaragua's national currency whose official value is 
equal to 10 US cents. 
8/ See Planning Ministry of Nicaragua, Programa de emergencia y reacti-
vación en beneficio del pueblo, January 1980. 
9/ Ministry of Economic Planning of Nicaragua, Programa económico de 
austeridad y eficiencia, 1981, January 1981. 
10/ At the end of 1981, approximately 55% of the total assets of the 
economy were in private hands, and 45% in the public sector. The State 
controlled 24% of the agricultural sector, 22% of manufacturing, 100% of 
mining and finance, and 40% of trade. 
( W Official 
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United States 72.6 
Western Europe 68.7 
Socialist countries 56.5 
Latin America 51.0 
Libya 100.0 
Credit lines 353.2 
Suppliers 24.6 
Of the above figure, during the period analysed, 840 million Dollars were 
utilized and debt servicing absorbed 370 million (90 million in amortization 
payments and 280 million in interest payments). 
12/ For a more detailed analysis of the situations described above, see 
CEPAL, Nicaragua: Notas para el Estudio Economico de America Latina, 
1980 y 1981 (CEPAL/MEX/1042 and E/CEPAL/MEX/1982/L.23). ~~ 
13/ See Nicaragua; Notas para el Estudio Economico, 1981, op. cit. 
14/ It is considered that in May manufacturing operated at 60% of its 
installed capacity. 
15/ Open unemployment had stood at 25%, 18% and 13% in 1979, 1980 and 
1981, respectively. 
16/ The average annual rate of increase in consumer prices had been 48%, 
35% and 24% in 1979, 1980 and 1981, respectively. 
17/ The cost-of-living index was expected to increase from 24% to 30% 
in 1982. 
18/ The other 50% would have to be imported in 1983. 
